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Abstract
I study the interaction of two forces in the formation of social groups: the pref-
erence for high quality peers and the desire for status among one’s peers. I present
a characterization of fundamental properties of equilibrium group structures in a
perfect information, simultaneousmove gamewhen groupmembership is priced
uniformly and cannot directly depend on type. While equilibrium groups gener-
ally exhibit some form of assortative matching between individual type and peer
quality, the presence of status concern reduces the potential degree of sorting and
acts as a force for greater homogeneity across groups. I analyse the effect of status
concern for the provision of groups under different market structures and partic-
ularly focus on the implications for segregation and social exclusion. I find that
status concern reduces the potential for and benefit from segregation - both for a
social planner and a monopolist - but the interaction of preference for rank and
status can make the exclusion of some agents a second-best outcome.
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1 Introduction
When people interact in a social environment, whether it is at work or school, in clubs
or in their neighborhood, social spillovers tend to play an important role. At work, co-
operation with colleagues might be essential, at school and university, studying with
peers can promote understanding and enhance the learning experience. For any team
sport, other players are a pre-requisite. In many of these situations, we would like to
be surrounded by ‘strong’ peers as their ability influences the benefit we gain from the
interaction. At the same time, we might want to be someone with a relatively high
standing in the group. This presents a clear tension: the stronger the peers, the lower
one’s own standing.
Considermoving house and choosing a newneighborhood: when facedwith the choice
between South Kensington, one of the most affluent boroughs in London, and Cam-
den, a borough with a more heterogeneous crowd, the decision is, among other fac-
tors, most likely influenced by the quality of public services, the valuation for these
and the price of living in the two boroughs. But in addition, one might also be wor-
ried about one’s own relative status among the potential neighbors. A lower crime rate
does not necessarily compensate for the discomfort caused by being one of the lowest
earners.
This paper develops a model to explore the importance of this (potential) tension in
the formation of social groups very much in the spirit of Frank (1985). It addresses
the questions what groups can be formed and what groups might be offered by a so-
cial planner, monopolist, or competitive firmwhen agents care about both the quality
of peers, as well as their standing within their group. The focus lies on two key as-
pects: segregation and social exclusion. It is explored how status concern affects the
segregation of agents i.e. how fine agents can be sorted into groups. And it is exam-
ined what status concern implies about social exclusion, addressing the question how
many agents might not be offered any social group.
In the model, a large number of agents observe a set of prices1 for groupmembership
and simultaneously decide which group to join. Agents are heterogeneous in their
type: a one-dimensional variable; for example, income. The agents’ payoff is deter-
mined by the composition of the group, the membership price, and their own type. In
particular, two statistics of the distribution of types within a group are payoff relevant:
the quality of the group - a function of the types of agents’ choosing the group - and the
1The ‘prices’ can, more generally, reflect different costs of joining a group.
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status of an individual - the rank in the distribution of types.2 It is assumed that there
is a positive interaction between type and the characteristics of a group. Agents with
higher type value quality and rank more; just like high earners might care more about
the quality of schools as well as their own social status. After exploring properties of
social groups that hold for any set of prices, the model is extended by introducing an
additional stage: a seller or ‘provider’ posts prices for social groups and then agents
choose from this set of prices. For simplicity, it is assumed that offering groups is cost-
less. This provider could, for example, be a local authority deciding on the number
and type of schools in the district and their tuition fees; or a firm developing a new
housing project, choosing how inclusive the development should be. The provider
might act as a benevolent social planner - the authority maximizing aggregate welfare
- or as a monopolist - the authority maximizing profits. In an extension, the role of
competition is also discussed.
It is shown that status concern reduces the possibility of, as well as the benefit from
segregation. More precisely, ‘splitting’ a population into several, separate groups is
less beneficial under status concern - both in terms of aggregate welfare and, under
some restrictions, in terms of revenue. This means any provider gains less from post-
ing prices that allow for finer sorting. Status concern is a force for homogeneity across
groups as it limits the degree to which groups can differ in their composition of types.
For example, if two groups are priced equally, then they have to be identical in their
probability distribution over types, not just their quality. Additionally, there might be
no prices that make a given group structure incentive compatible even though such
prices exist if agents only care about quality. No matter the objective of the group
provider, status concern leaves less room for manoeuvre. Sorting cannot be arbitrar-
ily fine as the groups take the form of non-overlapping intervals and the number of
such intervals in equilibrium is necessarily finite. If status concern is relatively more
important, less segregation can be achieved. In the extreme case where agents have
preferences only over their rank, no segregation is possible and all agents joining a
group pay the same price. In contrast, Board (2009) finds in a closely related setting
without status concern that for sufficiently convex quality functions, full separation
can indeed be both a welfare and profit maximizing equilibrium.
As a second key observation, the interaction between quality and status concern can,
2While social status can have multiple dimension, Heffetz and Frank (2011) argue that it is inherently
positional can be seen as a form of ‘rank’. The simplification in this model is that agents agree on the
same ranking. There is evidence that this is often the case. SeeWeiss and Fershtman (1998) for a survey
of the relevant economic and sociological literature.
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in combinationwith the limitation to anonymous pricing, make the exclusion of some
agents from any social group a second-best outcome. This is true even if in the first-
best, where agents can be directly assigned a group, full participation is optimal. If
agents care only about quality or only about status, this cannot be the case. In this
sense, the agents’ concern for status and quality can lead to social exclusion. The
group provider achieves social exclusion by setting all prices high enough so that some
agents strictly prefer not to join any group. Social exclusion can only be maintained
at the ‘bottom’; the set of excluded agents forms an interval at the low-end of the type
distribution. In the context of the education example, even an authority maximizing
utilitarianwelfaremight set university tuition fees such that some students choose not
to acquire higher education. If we alter the population distribution - suppose a group
of new agents arrive in a society - the planner might want to raise prices in order to
exclude the low-type arrivals even though their utility enters the planner’s objective
function. Similarly, if a new group of high-type agents arrives, a planner might set
prices such as to exclude some low-type agents that were previously members of a
group. Maybe surprisingly, in some cases a monopolist might charge a lower price for
the lowest-quality group and thus exclude fewer agents than a social planner.
These findings can inform the literature on social groups: if status concern is relevant
in a given setting, empirical investigationsmight lead to different conclusions andulti-
mately different policies. If policies are misspecified, there can be significant misallo-
cationsMore specifically, when agents care about their relative rank, we should expect
groups to be less segregated. If two groups are similar in quality, they should also be
similar in their distribution over types. In the empirical literature on Tiebout sorting3
- the sorting of agents into different communities based on their preferences for pub-
lic goods - it is often noted that communities are much more similar across and more
diverse within than should be expected.4 This squares with the finding on segregation
here. Status concern can, for a similar reason, have important implicationswhen iden-
tifying peer effects. If we try to measure the magnitude of complementarities by the
degree of segregation across groups, we need to consider how important status con-
siderations are. An absence of positive sorting can indicate strong rank preferences
rather than the absence or irrelevance of complementarities. This can, of course, lead
to very different policy implications. And finally, the presence of status concern can
imply that the welfare effects of otherwise unambiguous policy interventions become
less straight-forward. If, for instance, a policy maker aims to reduce social exclusion,
3See Tiebout (1956)
4See, for example, Persky (1990) and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001). Stephen Calabrese, Dennis Epple,
Thomas Romer and Holger Sieg (2006) provides empirical evidence for the role of peer effects in this.
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this might come at a cost of lower aggregate welfare.
Related Literature
The model presented here draws from two closely related theoretical papers: Board
(2009) investigates the optimal monopoly pricing of social groups when the agents’
types determine the quality of the group. It is shown that independent of the exact na-
ture of the quality function, the monopolist provision is too segregated and excludes
too many agents. As key distinction, in Board (2009) agents value the distribution of
types only in terms of group quality; the payoff is independent of other aspects of the
underlying distribution of types. In Rayo (2013), the agents’ type is their private infor-
mation and they obtain status through signals sold by a monopolist. The monopolist
thus controls the agents’ status. This can lead to pooling for some subsets of agents
and full-separation for others. Broadly speaking, in Board (2009) agents care about
local quality - the quality of their social group - while in Rayo (2013) they care about
global status - the status in the population. In the model developed here, agents have
preferences over local quality and local status.
Taking a broader perspective, there are two themes in the literature this paper re-
lates to: positional concerns and the provision of (semi)-public goods. The notion
that agents have preferences over their relative status has received considerable atten-
tion in various contexts. Veblen (1899)5 expressed the idea of conspicuous consump-
tion early on and Duesenberry (1949) stressed the importance of relative income in
consumption and savings decisions. Generally speaking, the conspicuous consump-
tion literature analyses the effects of preferences over consumption differences within
a reference group on equilibrium outcomes. As a key contribution, the model here
looks at the effects from social interaction as well as social comparison. For exam-
ple, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) study a setting where agents have preferences over
their rank in a distribution of a conspicuous consumption good. Becker, Murphy
and Werning (2005) characterize equilibrium income and consumption distributions
when market participants can trade status. Haagsma and van Mouche (2010) look
at the relation between heterogeneity of status preferences and actions in an ordi-
nal status game and find that status-seeking can lead to more homogeneous choices.
And Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) analyse how the social structure in a pure exchange
economy affect equilibrium prices and allocations; finding that relatively less well-off
5See Veblen (2007) [1899]. The Theory of the Leisure Class. Oxford world’s classics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
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agents can lose from social integration. Frank (1985) addresses the connection be-
tween status concern and sorting. And Ray and Robson (2012)6 focus particularly on
status as the rank in a distribution of a one-dimensional characteristic.
Rank enters utility in the same way as in this model. Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rus-
tichini (2012) provides a decision-theoretic foundation for such preferences. With a
stronger focus on ordinal comparisons, the literature on contests and tournaments
has examined status as a way to incentivize performance. Moldovanu, Sela and Shi
(2007), for example, looks at the optimal partition of agents into status categories. As
a key difference to this literature, in the model here status arises automatically within
a group and cannot be directly controlled by a third party. Nevertheless, the models
do share the zero-sum nature of status allocations.
The importance of positional concerns is also validated in the empirical literature.7
Particular attention has been paid to the link between relative income and well-being.
Alesina, di Tella andMacCulloch (2004) provide evidence that there is a significant re-
lation between the relative income position and self-reported happiness in both the
US and Europe. Card et al. (2012) exploit informational differences to investigate the
role of income inequality on work satisfaction. They find that having a lower income
rank than close peers has a significant negative effect on satisfaction. A similar conclu-
sion is reached by Brown et al. (2008) where the importance of income rank is high-
lighted specifically. Positional concerns can also be a driver for migration decisions
as shown in Stark and Taylor (1991). The role of relative income within a neighbour-
hood has been investigated extensively in Luttmer (2005) using data from the Ameri-
can Household survey. He not only finds that relative changes have an effect of similar
magnitude on life satisfaction as absolute ones, but also that the effect is stronger for
people that socialize more with their neighbors. Furthermore, Ashraf, Bandiera and
S. Lee (2014) presents evidence from an educational setting that people are aware of
their relative standing and that the salience and payoff-relevance of rank influences
choices. Additionally, there is experimental evidence from Jemmott and Gonzalez
(1989) that status affects performance in group settings; students performed better in
groups where they have high status. Perhaps most closely related, Bottan and Perez-
Truglia (2017) investigate locational preferences among medical students in the con-
text of the National Resident Matching Program with particular focus on relative in-
come rank. They find that people care about the cost of living and relative income
rank to a similar degree. They also demonstrate that there is significant heterogeneity
6See also Robson (1992).
7See Frank (2005) for a brief survey of the economic literature and Weiss and Fershtman (1998) for a
survey of both the economic and sociological literature.
6
in themagnitude of positional concerns and that this is driven by differences in valua-
tion of some of the spill-overs generated by the different locations - in this case dating
prospects.
There is a large body of literature on social spillovers and particularly the production
and sharing of ‘social goods’ that blur the line between purely public and private goods
- not unlike the quality of a group in the model proposed here. Buchanan (1965) es-
tablishes a foundation by augmenting a standard consumption model with clubs that
allow the sharing of a single consumption good. Those preferences can be either di-
rectly over the sharing good or simply the characteristics of other agents. In Levy and
Razin (2015), for instance, agents care directly about the average income of the agents
in their group. The literature on clubs has paid particular attention to existence and
stability of equilibria; primarily in the context of cooperative game theory. It has been
shown that when firms providing these clubs can freely enter the market, there is a
tension between heterogeneous preferences leading to differentiation and increasing
returns causing greater centralization.8 In a general equilibrium setting, Scotchmer
(2005) studies the pricing of clubs with heterogenous agents. If group memberships
can discriminate between relevant characteristics and thus effectively limit freemove-
ment of consumers, consumption externalities can be internalized.
The literature on networks delivers many additional insights by focusing on the spe-
cific structure within a group. Ultimately, this can be traced back tomodels of efficient
matching, for instance Becker (1973).9 Several papers have studied settings with social
spillovers that vary across different types. In a non-specific networking environment,
which is closest to the model here, agents choose how much to socialize across their
network, unable to discriminate between individuals. Durieu, Haller and Solal (2011)
analyse properties of Nash equilibria in such amodel where agents select between dis-
crete networking intensities that apply to all their links. Also taking the network struc-
ture as given, Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) study the provision of public goods in a
network when investments can be directed to specific links. Bloch and Dutta (2009)
endogenize both the link itself and the link quality. Cabrales, Calvó-Armengol and
Zenou (2011) study a setting where undirected investments in links generate positive
spillovers on private investment. Stable equilibria are characterized by too high or too
low investment relative to the Pareto efficient outcome. Baumann (2015) looks at a
8See Aumann and Dreze (1974) for the theoretical underpinnings and Demange and Henriet (1991) for
a stability result when preferences can be ordered along a single dimension.
9The supermodularity in traits of a match has a close analogy to the complementarity between group
and individual characteristics in this model.
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similar setting where benefits from (directed) investment across links are symmetric
but not separable and finds asymmetric equilibria in which some agents form many
low quality links while others establish few high quality connections.
The empirical literature on these social spillovers is too rich to attempt even a cursory
overview here. Instead, I focus on one particular issue raised in Tiebout (1956): the
endogenous sorting of agents in communities when preferences are heterogenous.
Tiebout has spawned a large literature that studies the provision of public goods by
competing jurisdictions that can differentiate through the public goods they offer and
the taxes they charge. Theoretically, this should lead agents to cluster efficiently.1011
The empirical evidence, however, has been mixed. The Tiebout model in its simple
form predicts relatively homogeneous communities within i.e. fine sorting.12 How-
ever, communities appear to be more heterogeneous within and accordingly more
similar across than predicted.13 This has been discussed in Persky (1990) andmore ex-
tensively in Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001) and Calabrese et al. (2006); the latter specif-
ically shows that this disparity can be largely resolved when allowing for preferences
over the composition of the communities.14 The model here captures some of these
aspects: depending on the group quality function, there can be an incentive to sepa-
rate finely but the preferences over rank can have an offsetting influence reducing the
benefit from sorting and limiting the degree of segregation.
The following parts of the paper are structured as follows: the next section presents
the model in detail. Section 3 establishes basic properties of social groups for an ex-
ogenous price vector and Section 4 analyses the social planner problem with particu-
lar focus on segregation and social exclusion. This is subsequently contrasted in Sec-
tion 3 to amonopolist provider followed by a brief discussion of a competitive setting.
Section 6 then presents a numerical example illustrating some key results. The final
section concludes. All omitted proofs can be found in Appendix A.
10For example, Conley and Wooders (2001) explore a settings where agents differ in tastes and genetic
types. Genetic types affect the cost of acquiring a ‘crowding’ type that causes an externality. They
characterize when taste-heterogeneous jurisdictions are optimal.
11Epple and Romano (2011) provides an overview of the Tiebout literature in the context of schooling
choices.
12A prediction that has been questioned, for example in Pack and Pack (1977).
13See Ghiglino and Nocco (2017) for a theoretical analysis of the the interaction between conspicuous
consumption and urban sorting.
14While Calabrese et al. (2006) delivers evidence for the importance for peer effects, the channels
through which they work remain unidentified.
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2 TheModel
A continuum of agents drawn from the Lebesgue unit interval I choose from a count-
able set of groups G as part of a complete information, simultaneous move game. An
agent is allowed to join at most one group. The action set is A =G∪ {;} where {;} rep-
resents the choice of not joining any group. Groupmembership is excludable through
prices. For each g ∈G , there is a charge pg ∈ R
+ for joining that group. The vector p
contains all such membership prices.15 The price of not joining any group is normal-
ized to 0. While these prices could be thought of more generally as costs associated
with participating in a group - membership in a country club not only requires the
payment of fees but also the right attire and the ability to travel there - they will, for
clarity, be interpreted more literally. For example, these could be the tuition fees at a
university or the membership fees of a social club.
Each agent has a one dimensional type or characteristic w ∈W where W is the set
of characteristics in the population.W is simply taken to be the closed interval [w ,w]
in R. L is a strictly positive probability measure onW and (W,Bw ,L ) is the corre-
sponding probability space. It admits a continuous density f with the corresponding
CDF denoted F . The agent space is the atomless probability space (Ω,B,P ) where
Ω = W × I and the Borel σ-algebra B = Bw ×B I .
16
P is the probability measure
L ×λwhere λ is the Lebesgue measure on the unit interval.17
By joining a group, agents gain access to the peer effects generated by the other agents
within the same group. In particular, I distinguish between two different types of
spillovers: there is a benefit φ that everybody values but potentially to a different de-
gree. φ could be interpreted as a preference over the composition of members or sim-
ply a public good that is ‘produced’ within the group with the output level depending
on themembers’ characteristics.18 In this sense, it can be seen as a form of social capi-
tal that exists within the group and is determined by themembers in it.19 I call this the
quality of the group. Formally,φ is ameasurable function thatmaps fromΩ toR+. This
can, for instance, be a statistic of the distribution of agents choosing the same group
15As a matter of convention, I take p to be in ascending order such that pi ≥ pi−1
16
B I is the Borel σ-algebra of the unit interval and BW accordingly the Borel σ-algebra ofW .
17This follow the modelling approach for infinitely many agents suggested in He, Sun and Sun (2017).
18As a specific example, Kacperczyk (2013) demonstrates the importance of university peers in the de-
cision to become an entrepreneur - mainly through the transmission of information and a reduction
in uncertainty. The information they hold is then key to the benefit from this effect.
19Coleman (1988) and Coleman (1990) characterizes ‘social capital’ as a type of (intangible) capital that
only exists within a social structure.
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like the average type, the median type, or the lowest or highest type.20 When φ is the
average type, this benefit from group membership very much relates to local-average
spillover models as characterized in, for instance, Ushchev and Zenou (2019).21 These
are commonly used to model (positive) peer-effects.
Furthermore, as a second type of spillover, agents have preferences over their rank in
the distribution of types within their group. I call this the status of an agent. Given the
agents that choose g , the rank rg (w) = Fg (w) of an agent with type w is the CDF of
types in g evaluated at w . In other words, rank is a function fromW and probability
distributions overW to [0,1]. This closely follows existing definitions of status as in,
for example, Ray and Robson (2012).
I characterize the agents that make the same choice in A as the social group - a ‘feasi-
ble’22 measure onW .
Definition 1 (Social groups). A social group L g is a Lebesgue measure on W with the
property that the combination of all such social groups
∑
g∈AL g (B) ≤L for any B ∈
BW . The vector containing all social groups is denoted L A
An agent of type w is in g (w ∈ g ) if some agents with trait w are part of the social
group L g - i.e. w is in the support of that social group.
Preferences of agents are represented as follows:
U
(
w,g ,L A
)
= u
(
w,φg ,rg (w)
)
−pg (1)
Beyond additive-separability of prices, I make the following assumptions on prefer-
ences and quality:
Assumption 1 (General). u(w,φr ) is continuous and at least twice differentiable. It
is strictly increasing in w, φ and r , and ∂
2
∂w∂φu(w,φ,r ) > 0,
∂2
∂w∂r u(w,φ,r ) > 0 and
∂2
∂φ∂r
u(w,φ,r ) ≥ 0. For every subset Wi ⊆W , φ is bounded for every social group L g
with its support contained inWi .
20Strictly speaking, it is a statistic of the distribution overW×A since the quality of a group g candepend
on the measure of agents joining the group, which is not captured by the probability distribution Fg ,
generated by the agents choosing group g .
21In a network setting, we could consider the members of each group connected and different groups
forming different components - with the important distinction that herewe consider an infinite num-
ber of a agents.
22Feasibility requires that for all measures L g with g ∈ A and all sets B ∈ BW , we have
∑
A L g (B) ≤
L (B).
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Assumption 2 (Single-crossing). If u(wˆ ,φ′,r ′)≥ u(wˆ ,φ,r ) for some r ′,r ∈ [0,1], φ′ ≥φ,
and wˆ ∈W , then this inequality holds for all w > wˆ .23
Assumption 3 (Stand-alone payoff). The stand-alone payoff for any social groupL g =
0 as well as the payoff from the isolation choice ; denoted u is such that u ≤ u(w,φ,0)
for all w ∈W where φ is the lower bound of φ givenW .
The general assumptions capture the notion that agents not only value quality and
rank but that this valuation is increasing in their own type. A mere scaling ofW does
not diminish the effect of either component. People with higher wealth living in a
richer neighbourhood might exhibit stronger positional concerns. They might also
have a higher valuation for school quality and other public goods exclusive to their
neighbourhood. 24 25 Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007), for example, provide ev-
idence that more highly educated households value the education characteristics of
their neighboursmore. And Barrow (2002) finds evidence that the valuation for school
quality is positively related with income and education. The fact that these prefer-
ences tend to be observable through location choice implies that they are not (en-
tirely) obscured by status concerns. This motivates Assumption 2. It essentially states
that if an agent of type w prefers higher quality over a given rank trade-off, then this
must also be the case for agents with a higher type. Otherwise status concern might
outweigh other preferences and impede positive sorting simply by assumption. To il-
lustrate the assumption in terms of the university choice example, suppose a student
prefers university A over university B where A offers a higher educational quality but
the student’s relative ability is less at A. Then, under Assumption 2, a student with
higher ability would also prefer university A if she faced the same quality/rank trade-
off.
Assumption 3 states that agents that choose not to participate, do not interact in this
social environment. Someone who chooses not to study does not benefit from any
spillovers in higher education institutions. Finally, joining any group is generally ben-
eficial - at least at 0 cost.26
23In other words, u is such that the single-crossing property in the sense of Edlin and Shannon (1998)
holds.
24This is similar to models where rank enters multiplicatively as in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004).
25This can be seen to an analogy to the ‘networks as resources’ view in the sociological literature. Con-
nections with peers can be interpreted as a resource - for example due to the information peers hold.
See, for example, Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert (1986) for evidence that people with higher so-
cioeconomic status are better connected and have thus better access to network resources. Sobel
(2002) offers a critical (economic) perspective of this literature on social capital.
26It is, for the following analysis, without loss to simply assume u is equal to the lowest possible payoff
an agent can receive in any group u = u(w ,φ,0).
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We can now introduce the equilibrium notion. We refer to this (sub-)game in which
the agents observe the prices of groups and then join a group as the agents’ game. We
are interested in pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We can consider such an equilibrium
as an assignment of agents to groups such that, given the social groups generated by
the assignment, no agents (measure 0 set) can be made strictly better-off by an indi-
vidual deviation.
Definition2 (Equilibrium). Apure Nash Equilibrium in the agents’ game is aB-measurable
function y from the agent space to A that either assigns each agent a group g ∈G or no
group (;), with the property that for all agents i ∈Ωwith type w(i ):
U
(
w(i ), y(i ),L A
)
≥U (w(i ),a,L A) ∀a ∈ A
where L A is the vector of social group generated by the assignment function y.
27
Given an assignment, only some social groups might have a non-zero measure of
agents and, mainly to avoid the negation, I call these non-empty groups the active
social groups. An active price pg is the membership price of an active social group.
The smallest convex set containing the support of an active social group L g is de-
noted [w g ,w g ].
28 The highest type in any group g is thus w g , and the lowest w g .
In several instances the outcomes under preferences with status concern are con-
trasted against preferences where agents care only about quality or only about status.
The utility functions below are used for these comparisons.
The utility function for agents without status concern is defined as:
U q (w,g ,L A)= u(w,φg ,r )−pg
for some constant r ∈ [0,1]. And similarly, the utility for agents with only status con-
cern is defined as:
U r (w,g ,L A)= u(w,φ,rg (w))−pg
for some constant φ ∈R+.
I refer to preferences characterized by U as preferences with status concern, prefer-
ences captured byU q as preferences without status concern, and those described by
U r as preferences over status only.
27We treat L ; as a ’special’ social group in which agents do not interact and thus by assumption
U (w,;,L A)= u
28Clearly, for any social group w g ≤w and w g ≥w
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3 Structure of Social Groups
We start by analysing some fundamental properties of equilibrium social groups. De-
spite the potential multiplicity in equilibria typical for coordination games, the struc-
ture of equilibrium social groups can be characterized in terms of the relation between
price, quality, and the ‘extreme’ types in each group. This is then contrasted to a set-
ting with no status concern. While status concern adds some potential freedom in
how distributions can overlap, it generally imposes stronger restrictions on how ex-
actly the distributions over types can differ. This section thus explores properties that
have to be fulfilled given any price vector, independent of how these prices arise. I
then restrict attention to equilibria that are ‘stable’ in the sense that they don’t rely on
indifference of a continuumof agents. I exploit those results in the subsequent section
to characterize equilibria in a sequential game where first some provider - like a social
planner or monopolist - sets these prices and then agents make their group choice.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, two active social groups have equal prices pg = ph if
and only if they are identical in their probability distribution overW , meaning Fg = Fh .
Proof: All omitted proofs are in Appendix A.
Let us first consider the extreme case where all prices are equal: Proposition 1 implies
the probability distribution overW generated by an active social group must be iden-
tical to all other active social groups. There can be very little variation across groups.
The relevant statistics - quality and status - need to be identical. Such homogeneous
price vectors can arise from legal or practical restrictions. For example, in countries
where tuition fees are set on a national level, this model would predict that the distri-
bution of student ability should look very similar across universities if students care
about their rank in the distribution at their university (abstracting from other factors
like regional variation and locational preferences). Furthermore, this can have impli-
cations for sorting at work. If an employer lets agents freely decide on their team or
choose their shift, and if employees need to be equally paid, for instance due to union
rules, then we should expect the distribution of abilities within each team to reflect
the overall distribution of abilities. This might give an indication why even when an
employer has a strict incentive to create such representative teams, it might not be
necessary to actively allocate workers across teams. 29 Without status concern, only
the quality would have to be the same across active groups.
As the proposition states, this logic generalizes to any two groups that are equally
29See Mas andMoretti (2009)
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priced. If they are both active groups, meaning they are chosen by agents in equi-
librium, then status concern puts a strong requirement on the homogeneity across
groups. Equal prices imply equal quality. But if two groups are equally priced and
equal in quality, agents choose the group inwhich they achieve the higher rank. There-
fore, the rank r (w) that members with type w can attain needs to be the same across
these groups. This, in turn, implies that the probability distributions overW need to
be the same. The only remaining differences between groups can be in size i.e. the
measure of agents in each group. Whether or not such differences can exist in equilib-
rium depends on the quality function φ. If φ is invariant to the size of the group and
only depends on the probability distribution over types, it displays no returns to scale
and equivalently, if φ changes if the measure over W is scaled, it displays returns to
scale.
Definition 3. Any two social groupsL g ,L h are identical up to size ifL g (B)= κL h(B)
for some κ> 0 and all B ∈BW . They are identical if κ= 1.
Corollary 1.1. If in equilibrium there are two active social groupsL g ,L h with pg = ph ,
then they must be such that:
a) if φ has no returns to scale then L g and L h are identical up to size.
b) if φ has returns to scale then L g and L h are identical.
If any two active groups are priced equally, then if φ depends on the size of the social
group, these groups must be measure-0 identical. If φ only depends on the probabil-
ity distribution of types but not the size of the social group, then any such two social
groups must be identical up-to a positive scaling parameter.
Moving to amore general price vector, we can ask how group quality, cut-off types and
prices are related. The following definition establishes a particular link between qual-
ity and extreme types. If it is fulfilled, any strict ordering in quality implies a related
weak ordering in extreme types and vice versa. In its strict version, any strict ordering
in quality implies a related strict ordering in type and vice versa. For instance, if social
groups are strictly monotonic in the highest type, then ifwh >w g for two active social
groups, we can also conclude that φh >φg .
Definition 4 (Monotonicity). Social groups are monotonic in quality
(i) at the top if for any two active groups g ,h ∈G:
φh >φg ⇒wh ≥w g
14
(ii) at the bottom if for any two active groups g ,h ∈G:
φh >φg ⇒wh ≥w g
Social groups are monotonic in type
(i) at the top if for any two active groups g ,h ∈G:
wh >w g ⇒φh ≥φg
(ii) at the bottom if for any two active groups g ,h ∈G:
wh >w g ⇒φh ≥φg
We call them strictly monotonic if the inequalities are strict.
As the following Proposition establishes, we can indeed equivalently order social groups
by their highest type and their quality. Furthermore, if we can strictly rank two groups
by the lowest type in each group, say wh >w g , then the ordering in terms of quality is
the same, i.e. φh > φg . And finally, if we can strictly rank two groups by their quality,
sayφh >φg , then this means the lowest type in h has to be at least weakly greater than
the lowest type in g .
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium, social groups are strictly monotonic in type at the
top and bottom, strictly monotonic in quality at the top andweaklymonotonic in qual-
ity at the bottom.
In equilibrium, social groups are such that we can observe some degree of assortative
matching between quality and type - at least at the top and bottom end of groups. The
potential trade-off between rank and quality allows for a greater variety strictly inside
of the support of groups. For instance, just because an agent of type w ′ chooses a
group with quality φ′ does not imply that all types w > w ′ choose a group of quality
φ ≥ φ′. But if an agent of type w ′ is member in a group with quality φ′ where she
obtains rank 1, then all agents with higher type must be in a group with strictly higher
quality. Intuitively, if themost able student at University A is better than themost able
at University B, then University A must also have the higher educational quality.
Figure 1 shows a structure ruled out by Proposition 2. There are two social groups and
strict monotonicity in type at the bottom implies that φ2 > φ1. But then strict mono-
tonicity in quality at the top requires w2 > w1 which is not the case. Figure 2, on the
other hand, shows a possible equilibrium structure with φ2 >φ1.
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Figure 1: A group structure ruled out by Proposition 2
The monotonicity in quality has implications for the prices of groups in equilibrium.
The larger social spillovers generated by a higher quality group require a larger mone-
tary transfer to avoid low ranked agents in lower quality groups to join. A group with
higher quality needs to have a higher price. To stay within the previous example, tu-
ition fees at University A need to be higher. In Figure 2, the price of g2 needs to be
strictly greater than that of g1.
Corollary 2.1. In equilibrium, for any two active social groups L h ,L g :
φh >φg ⇔ ph > pg
Similar to the result that equal prices must imply equal characteristics of groups, we
find that if two groups are equal in their highest type then they must be identical in
their payoff-relevant characteristics:
Corollary 2.2. For any two active social groups L g ,L h in equilibrium,
(i) if φ has no returns to scale, wh =w g if any only if the social groups are identical up
to size.
(ii) if φ has returns to scale, wh =w g if any only if the social groups are identical.
3.1 Stable Equilibria
Attention is now restricted to equilibria that exhibit a certain stability. If groups differ
in quality, then any intersection of their supports on a set of positive measure requires
the agents in this set to be exactly indifferent between higher rank versus higher qual-
ity. But indifference for a continuum of agents entails a degree of instability. Suppose,
for example, a number of students over a range of abilities is indifferent between two
schools. Now if the distribution of one of these schools is slightly perturbed, either
because the distribution changes or because the perception of it is altered, then the
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status of almost all students in that school is affected. Indifference breaks necessarily
for almost everybodywith an ability in the overlap; even if this perturbation is arbitrar-
ily small. When the distribution is altered by, for instance, adding a measure of agents
around some w , then the rank of almost all agents above that is increased while that
of those below is reduced. Independent of the effect on quality, indifference can’t hold
for (almost) anyone.30
Definition 5 (ǫ-Perturbation). AmeasureL ǫg is an ǫ-perturbation of a social groupL g
if L ǫg ≤L and the related quality φ
ǫ
g and rank r
ǫ
g differ from φg and rg by at most ǫ.
Clearly, for ǫ large enough, any active social group is the ǫ-perturbation of another. But
for small ǫ, it allows us to describe the set of (potential) groups that are similar in status
and quality. Given the continuity of φ, such a perturbation always exists. Stability
here is the notion that if one equilibrium group was to be replaced by a very similar
group (even if this group is not actually feasible), then the set of agents for which the
membership in this perturbed group is suboptimal should also be small. Negligible
differences in groups (or the perception of these groups) should have negligible effects
on outcomes. The following refinement captures this:
Definition 6 (Stable equilibrium). An equilibrium is stable if for any ǫ-perturbation of
any active social group L g , as ǫ→ 0, the measure of agents with w ∈W such that
U
(
w,g ,L ′A
)
≥U
(
w,a,L ′A
)
∀a ∈ A (2)
where L ′A is the perturbed vector of social groups, approaches L g .
Take any equilibrium group structure. This equilibrium is stable if after the status or
quality in any group is perturbed by an arbitrarily small amount, the set of agents for
which the group assignment is not optimal is also arbitrarily small. As the following
Lemma concludes, this rules out any overlap in between the supports of groups:
Lemma 1. In any stable equilibrium, the intersection of the supports of all active social
groups has measure 0.
As the following result states, stability significantly narrows down the type of social
groups that can form in equilibrium. At the same time, it does not pose an issue with
existence. Stability simply rules out any overlaps in the support; whether complete
overlaps, as in the case of social groups with equal cost that are identical up to size,
or partial overlaps. The supports of all active social groups (that are not the isolation
choice) form an interval partition of [w,w] where w ≥w .
30At an endpoint, e.g. at r = 0, indifference might still hold but these have measure 0.
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Figure 2: A possible equilibrium structure that is not stable
Proposition 3. In a stable equilibrium, the group structure can be represented by an
interval partition of [w1,w] with w1 ≥ w. The support of any active social group is
convex.
The convexity result highlights that in a stable equilibrium, there can be no ‘gaps’ in
the support of any social group. Any such gap is driven by the rank/quality trade-off.
Since the two groups can’t be identical in quality, a gap in the support means that the
agents with types in that gap achieve higher utility in a lower quality group.31 But this
can only arise if there are also intersections in the support. These are ruled out by sta-
bility. A group structure as in Figure 2 cannot be a stable equilibrium.
Stability allows for a stricter monotonicity result. Since there can be no overlaps, a
higher group quality implies a higher lowest type and vice versa. Given the interval
structure, we can further conclude that for any two active groups with φh > φg , we
need wh ≥w g ; the lowest type in the higher quality group needs to be weakly greater
than the highest type in the lower quality group.
Corollary 3.1. In a stable equilibrium, social groups are strictly monotonic in type and
quality.
Without the stability refinement, we were able to conclude that if two groups have
equal quality, they must be equally priced and have equal support. With stability we
find that there can be no two active groups of equal quality at all. It is thereforewithout
loss to think of agents paying the same price as being members of the same group.
Corollary 3.2. In a stable equilibrium, there can be no two active social groups equal in
price or quality.
31In the opposite case, where the quality of the group covering the gap is higher, the single-crossing
assumption would imply that all higher types achieve higher utility in that group. This could not be
an equilibrium independent of stability.
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With the combination of status concern and stability, we are able to eliminate some
multiplicity. Any groups equal in quality need to be equal in their distribution over W.
With stability, every type needs to be assigned just one group. Accordingly, there can
be only one group of a particular quality. Following those results, not only can we rep-
resent an equilibrium group structure as an interval partition I ,32 but every interval
corresponds to a distinct group. In the following sections, stable equilibrium social
groups will be characterized by the partition ofW they induce. When convenient, we
highlight the equilibrium group structure or equilibrium partition that a set of prices
induces, rather than the social groups themselves.
Definition 7 (Equilibrium Group Structure). I = {w1, ...,w} is called an equilibrium
group structure if there exists an assignment y : W → A such that for every interval
[wi ,wi+1]withwi ,wi+1 ∈I , there is a unique gi ∈G with y(w)= gi for all w ∈ (wi ,wi+1]
and y(w)=; for all w ∈ [w ,w1) and there exists a p such that this is an equilibrium in
the agents’ game.
3.2 Degree of Sorting
We now explore how status concern affects the equilibrium sorting or ‘segregation’.33
It is shown that with status concern, there is a bound on the number of active so-
cial groups in a stable equilibrium. If we parametrize status concern, we find that a
stronger preference for status reduces the number of active groups that can be main-
tained and, in the extreme case where only status matters, there can only be a ‘repre-
sentative’ social group.
Without status concern, given a suitable price vector, any interval partition can be
maintained in equilibrium; at least if the group quality is increasing in types.34 The
preference of agents over status in their social group puts a limit to this:
Proposition 4. There is an upper bound k ≥ 1 on the number of active social groups in
any stable equilibrium.
The economic intuition is that for a very fine group structure, the quality difference
between any two adjacent groups is very small. But because of the interval structure,
there is a cut-off type that achieves rank 1 in one group and rank 0 in the other. If
32
I is taken to be a set of points that partitionsW or a subset thereof
33I refer to a population being (unambiguously) more segregated if the equilibrium group structure is
finer. This is, of course, only a partial order.
34If the groupqualityφ ismonotone in type in the sense that if almost all types in a group are higher then
the quality of that group is (weakly) higher, then any (convex) interval partition can bemaintained as
a group structure in equilibrium. See Definition 9 for a formal definition of monotonicity.
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groups are too close in quality, incentive compatibility for such social groups cannot
hold for any vector of prices. In an equilibrium, the quality difference between two
adjacent social groups needs to be sufficiently large if agents have status concern. If
University A is almost identical to University B but any student in A could achieve a
strictly higher rank in B, then this is not an equilibrium outcome independent of the
tuition fees.
The economic intuition is that for a very fine group structure, the quality difference
between any two adjacent groups is very small. But because of the interval structure,
there is a cut-off type that achieves rank 1 in one group and rank 0 in the other. If
groups are too close in quality, incentive compatibility for such social groups cannot
hold for any vector of prices. In an equilibrium, the quality difference between two
adjacent social groups needs to be sufficiently large if agents have status concern. If
University A is almost identical to University B but any student in A could achieve a
strictly higher rank in B, then this is not an equilibrium outcome independent of the
tuition fees.
We can further show that this is ‘monotone’ in status-concern: as status becomes
more important, the maximum number of active social groups in a stable equilib-
rium decreases. To capture this comparative static, I write preferences as uα(w,φ,r )≡
u(w,φ,r )+αv(w,r ) for some 0≤α<∞ and a continuous and differentiable function
v with ∂
∂r
v(w,r )> 0, ∂
2
∂r∂w
v(w,r )> 0.35 Ordering preferences by this parameter α, we
can conclude that as α increases, less segregation can be maintained.
Corollary 4.1. The least upper-bound on the number of active social groups in any sta-
ble equilibrium is weakly decreasing in α.
But the fact that a stronger status concern allows for less segregation does not hinge
on the stability refinement. Without stability, groups can ‘overlap’ and we cannot de-
scribe segregation in terms of the coarseness of the partition ofW . However, in a sense
groups need to be more similar. In Appendix B, it is shown that for any increasing
sequence of α’s approaching infinity, in any corresponding sequence of probability
distributions of active social groups, the difference between these distributions has to
converge uniformly to 0. Furthermore, as α increases, these distributions have to be
arbitrarily close to the population distribution - at least over their support. If status
concern becomes very important, agents can still be excluded from participating in
social groups but differences in active social groups have to disappear.
35All previous assumptions on preferences are maintained.
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Taking this yet one step further, if agents have preferences over status only, previously
defined asU r , then no segregation can be achieved at all. If there are multiple groups,
then they must be identical in their payoff relevant characteristics p and r . In a stable
equilibrium, there can only be one active social group whose probability distribution
is equal to the population distribution over the support of the group.36
Corollary 4.2. If agents have preferences over status only, then in any equilibrium all
active social groups must be identical up to size and have equal prices. In a stable equi-
librium, there can be at most one active social group.
4 Social Planner
We now explore status concern in the context of aggregate welfare. Rather than just
asking what groups can be offered, wemight be interested in what groups a utilitarian
welfare maximizer wants to offer. For this purpose, an additional stage is introduced
to the game. A group provider first offers a menu of prices and groups. The agents
then, after observing this menu, choose which group to join. This is modelled as a
direct communication mechanism where agents report their type to the mechanism
(themessage space being restricted toW ) and then get assigned a group and payment.
The solution concept is a correlated equilibrium (in the sense of Myerson (1982) and
Aumann (1987)). As a key assumption, the mechanism designer has no direct control
over the status of an individual. If an agentwas to submit a different type, it is assumed
that agents within the same group still recognize the agent’s true type and he thus ob-
tains the same status. In contrast to Rayo (2013), it is not the mechanism that awards
status. An agent’s type is known by the other members without any involvement of
the designer. This captures settings where agents have good information about their
peers or can easily signal their type.37
We can think of the planner as a local government authority planning the provision
of public goods that involve some form of social interaction. In the context of edu-
cation, the local authority in a school district might determine which schools to offer
and how to set entry barriers. Or a housing boardmight want to plan new housing de-
velopments to maximize aggregate welfare. The question here is whether to set prices
36In fact, if uw (w,0)< 0 where u(w,r )≡ u(w,φ,r ) then the only active social group can be the represen-
tative group, i.e. all agents join the same group.
37Ashraf, Bandiera and S. Lee (2014) provides evidence in an educational setting where this is indeed
the case. Participants in a training scheme seem to be aware of their position in the distribution of
relative abilities.
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such as to segregate residents according to some dimension, e.g. income, or create a
more inclusive housing project.
Definition 8 (Group provision). A group provision is a BW -measurable function
m :W → A×R+
A group provision generates social groups in the sense of Definition 1. For every g ∈G ,
the associated social group L g is such that for every B ⊂W , L g (B) = L (m
−1(g ×
R
+)∩B). The resulting vector of social groups is again denoted L A.
38 Analogous to
the previous notation, the group assignment of an agent of type w consistent withm
is denoted y(w) and the price as p(w) so that the group provision can be decomposed
intom(w)= (y(w),p(w)).
Agents’ preferences can be written as:
U (w,m(w ′),L A)= u(w,φy(w ′),ry(w ′)(w))−p(w
′) (3)
where w ′ ∈W is the type reported by the agent. Note that even if w ′ is reported, the
agent still obtains rank ry(w ′)(w) where y(w
′) is the group assignment following report
w ′.
The planner problemcanbewritten as a problemof setting prices and assigning agents
to groups such that the group provision is incentive compatible and individually ra-
tional (i.e. satisfies the participation constraint). Incentive compatibility requires that
reporting the true type is optimal for all agents:
U (w,m(w),L A)≥U (w,m(w
′),L A) ∀w,w
′
∈W (4)
We can then state the planner problem as:
max
m(w)
∫
W
[
U (w,m(w),L A)+p(w)
]
dF (w)
s.t . U (w,m(w),L A)≥U (w,m(w
′),L A) ∀w,w
′
∈W
U (w,m(w),L A)≥ u ∀w ∈W
(5)
38While the stand-alone choice ; is included in the group provision, individual rationality requires the
price to be 0
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where F is the population distribution overW as defined by L , and L A is the vector
of social groups generated by m(w). Incentive compatibility then requires that p(w)
is constant over the support of each group: 39
Lemma 2. Every incentive compatible group provision m(w) =
(
y(w),p(w)
)
is such
that p(w)= p(w ′) for all w,w ′ ∈W with y(w)= y(w ′).
Following this result, we can write the planner problem as the optimal choice of as-
signment y(w) and membership prices p:
max
y(w),p
∫
W
[
U (w,m(w),L A)+py(w)
]
dF (w)
s.t . U (w,m(w),L A)≥U (w,m(w
′),L A) ∀w
′
∈W
U (w,m(w),L A)≥ u ∀w ∈W
(6)
Since incentive compatibility requires the planner to offer a uniform price for each
group, we can continue to denote the vector of all group prices as p. As a convention,
this does not include the ‘price’ for the stand-alone social group L ; which is by de-
fault 0. Despite the modified focus, the previous results hold, as Proposition 5 shows:
Proposition 5. A group provision m(w)=
(
y(w),p(w)
)
is incentive compatible and in-
dividually rational if and only if p(w) is constant for each active social group and y(w)
is a stable equilibrium in the agents’ (sub-)game given p.
Wecan conclude that the optimal groupprovision is equivalent to the planner-optimal,
stable equilibrium in the agents’ game. This allows us to proceedwith the previous no-
tation.
Any transfer paid by an agent enters the objective function and is part of aggregate
welfare (as opposed to money burning).40 Since the transfers cancel out, the planner
maximizes welfare as if there were none. Prices simply serve the purpose of maintain-
ing incentive compatibility:
Incentive Compatibility and Prices
Before developing results on segregation and exclusion, let’s first examine the con-
straint incentive compatibility poses on the groups that a planner can provide.
39As y(w) is a function, the supports of the social groups generated by the correspondingm(w) intersect
on ameasure 0 set. We can thus again describe the social groups in terms of the partitionI ofW they
generate.
40Recall thatU (w,m(w),L A)≡ u(w,φy(w),ry(w)(w))−p(w).
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For each active social group L g and w ∈ g , define:
∆r (w,g )≡ u(w,φg ,rg (w))−u(w,φg ,0)
and
∆r (w,g )≡ u(w,φg ,rg (w))−u(w,φg ,1)
This is the difference between the actual utility obtained by a w-agent and the utility
he would receive if he had rank 0 and 1 respectively. Take any two adjacent groups g
and h with φh > φg . Incentive compatibility holds if and only if prices are such that
for all w ∈ g :
u(w,φh ,0)−u(w,φg ,0)−∆r (w,g )≤ ph −pg (7)
and for all w ∈ h:
u(w,φh ,1)−u(w,φg ,1)+∆r (w,h)≥ ph −pg (8)
At the boundary between any two active social groups L h and L g , we have a cut-off
type wˆ = wh = w g with rh(wˆ) = 0 and rg (wˆ) = 1. Since agents of this type need to be
indifferent between both groups, incentive compatibility completely pins down the
price difference:
ph −pg ≥ u(wˆ ,φh ,0)−u(wˆ ,φg ,0)−∆r (wˆ ,g )
ph −pg ≤ u(wˆ ,φh ,1)−u(wˆ ,φg ,1)+∆r (wˆ ,h)
which imply
ph −pg = u(wˆ ,φh ,0)−u(wˆ ,φg ,1) (9)
Without status concern, ∆r (w,h)=∆r (w,g )= 0 for all w . Given the complementarity
between type and quality, incentive compatibility is thus satisfied for all agents if (9)
holds for any two adjacent groups. Under status concern, this is not necessarily the
case. The single-crossing assumption guarantees that if (8) is satisfied for some type
w , it also holds (strictly) for all w ′ > w . However, ‘upward’ incentive compatibility in
(7) might not hold. Problems with incentive compatibility can arise because ∆r (w,g )
is increasing in w . An agent with low rank in group g loses less from switching to a
higher quality group because of the lower rank in g .41 The smaller the quality differ-
41Stark and Taylor (1991) present evidence that a low relative income rank increases the probability of
(temporary) migration to a higher income country relative to internal migration. This is consistent
with the notion that people with a lower rank have less status to lose when switching to a new refer-
ence group. They can have a stronger incentive to join to a group with higher spillovers despite the
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ence φh −φg , the more of a problem this is. Furthermore, if the quality difference is
‘too small’, then no prices might exist such that (9) holds.
Suppose a local school authority tries to separate students along different ability lev-
els. If the quality of education is nevertheless similar across these schools, then such
a separation cannot be achieved through tuition fees. This can arise for two rea-
sons: students that have a low rank in the lower quality school might strictly prefer
the higher quality school given the price difference pinned down by the cut-off type.
Or low ranked students in the higher quality school strictly prefer to switch down and
achieve a high rank. There is no set of prices that achieves the desired cut-off.
This discussion leads to two observations: First, a social planner can only provide so-
cial groups such that given the dispersion in types, the quality differences between
groups are sufficiently large. And second, since only price differences matter, any in-
centive compatible full-participation group structure can be offered with the lowest
price 0. For an equilibrium provision, we can thus focus on incentive compatibility
alone as the participation constraint poses no issue.
4.1 Status and Segregation
Without status concern, the degree of segregation or sorting a social planner would
want to induce is determined by the ‘convexity’ of the group quality. If splitting a group
leads to a sufficient increase in average quality, such a split is welfare improving. This
can lead to arbitrarily fine sorting. For example, if the quality of a group only depends
on the lowest type, then any split increases aggregate welfare. As was shown in Propo-
sition 4, under status concern the number of groups in any equilibrium is necessarily
finite. Status concern imposes a limit to the degree of segregation that can be sus-
tained in equilibrium. As will be shown in this section, status concern also lowers a
planner’s incentive to segregate in the first place - at least as long as status concern
does not change the valuation of quality on aggregate.
General welfare comparisons in this context are difficult to make without imposing
strong assumptions onhowpreferenceswith andwithout status concern relate to each
other. To minimize these, I restrict attention to Welfare rankings of group structures
that can be unambiguously compared in terms of coarseness - i.e. segregation - aswell
as participation - i.e. social exclusion.
complementarities in type and quality.
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The following assumption rules out that the effect of changes in quality on aggre-
gate depends on status concern. If we look at an entire group, then under Assump-
tion 4, on average agents value quality the same whether or not they have preferences
over status. For example, if we add up all the individual valuations within a school,
then a change in school quality should have the same aggregate welfare consequences
whether or not students care about their relative standing within the school. A suffi-
cient (but not necessary) condition for this to be fulfilled is that preferences are sepa-
rable in quality and status - thus closely resembling the utility-representation derived
in Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2012). This assumption for a cleaner result
but an equivalent statement could be made as long as this interaction is sufficiently
small.
Assumption 4 (Status-quality neutrality). Preferences are such that for every measure
L g ≤L with support over [w1,w2]⊆W and associated φ and r :
∂
∂φ
∫w2
w1
u(w,φ,r (w))dF (w)=
∂
∂φ
∫w2
w1
u(w,φ,r0)dF (w)
where r0 ∈ [0,1] is the constant rank forU
q (w,m(w),L A)≡ u(w,φy(w),r0)−p(w).
It is now shown that given any incentive compatible group provision, offering a finer
group structure has a less positive (more negative) effect onwelfare if agents have pref-
erences over rank than with preferences over quality only.
Suppose there exist group provisions m(w) and mq (w) for preferences with (U ) and
without (U q ) status concern such that the partition I represents the associated equi-
librium group structure. Suppose further that I ′ is a strictly finer partition than I
and there are also incentive compatible provisionsm′(w) andmq ′(w) that induce I ′
under the respective preferences.
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 4, offeringm′(w) compared tom(w) achieves higher
aggregate welfare under status concern only if offering mq ′(w) compared to mq (w)
achieves higher aggregate welfare without status concern.
Intuitively, if we could freely allocate ranks to agents, the complementarity between
type and rank would lead us to assign high ranks to high-type agents. If any social
group is split, then almost all agents in the higher group are assigned a lower rank than
before and almost all agents in the lower group a higher rank. Since the total measure
does not change, this leads to a drop in welfare due to the complementarity between
type and rank. Since the effect of a change in φ is the same with and without status
concern, given this re-assignment of ranks, we can conclude that the overall effect on
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welfare is less positive under status concern. Segregation (potentially) helps to match
quality and type efficiently but there is a necessary loss from the mismatch between
type and rank.
This tension between the ‘allocation’ of status and quality can be further illustrated by
again parametrizing status concern. As status becomes relatively more important, the
benefit from segregation falls. To capture this comparative static, we write preferences
again asuα(w,φ,r )≡ u(w,φ,r )+αv(w,r ) for some 0≤α<∞. Ordering preferences by
this parameter α, we can conclude that as α increases, segregation not only becomes
harder to maintain but is also less beneficial.
Letmα(w) andmα
′(w) refer to incentive compatible group provisions that, under sta-
tus concern with parameter α, lead to the group partitions I and I ′, with I ′ finer
than I :
Corollary 6.1. With preferences uα(w,φ,r ), the group provisionmα
′(w) achieves higher
aggregate welfare than mα(w) only if m
′
αˆ
(w) achieves higher aggregate welfare than
mαˆ(w) under uαˆ(w,φ,r ) for all αˆ ∈ [0,α].
In the extreme case where agents only have preferences over status, segregation into
several social groups cannot be maintained and is not optimal. If so, the second-best
outcome is unique (up to the level of transfers) and is equal to the first-best.
Corollary 6.2. With preferences over status only (U r ), the full participation groupL g =
L is the uniquewelfare-maximizing group structure. There exists an equilibriumgroup
provision m(w) that induces this group structure.
4.1.1 Example: Segregation and welfare loss
While status concern makes segregation less beneficial, it can nevertheless cause a
large welfare loss if the reduced possibility to segregate agents interacts sufficiently
negatively with the group quality. This example demonstrates such a setting.
Consider a quality function φ that in sensitive to ‘congestion’. If a group exceeds a
certain size, the benefit to the members decreases:
φg =w g + 1L g (W )≤ǫ(K1−K0)+K0
where K1 > K0 > 0, ǫ ∈ (0,1), and 1 the indicator function. For a group with measure
less or equal ǫ, the quality equals the highest type plus a constant K1. If the size of the
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group surpasses the threshold ǫ, then the quality of the group drops by K1−K0. For
simplicity, let types be distributed uniformly over [w ,w] and the utility be separable
in rank and quality:
u(w,φ,r )=wφ+αw(r −
1
2
)
As the quality of a given group is determined (beyond themeasure) by the highest type,
if there was no congestion (ǫ= 1), the welfare maximizing partition would be the rep-
resentative group. Any further segregation lowers the quality of some groups, without
increasing the quality of any other group. Due to the congestion, the representative
group is no longer optimal if K1−K0 is large enough. In this case, some segregation is
optimal. In particular - ignoring incentive compatibility - if the increase in quality by
avoiding the negative effect of congestion is large enough, then in the optimal provi-
sion groups are segregated as much as necessary and are all reduced to measure less
or equal ǫ. Without status concern, there exist prices such that this can be achieved
in an incentive compatible way. As the following two cases show, a relatively small in-
crease in status concern can, however, lead to a large welfare loss if it means that the
first-best group structure can no longer be implemented:
Case 1: α= 0, K1−K0 >w −w
Agents don’t exhibit status concern. The welfare-maximizing group structure is the
interval partition I ǫ with F (wi )−F (wi−1)= ǫ for all wi ∈ I
ǫ with i > 2. All groups have
exactly measure ǫ (except for the lowest quality group which has measure ≤ ǫ). Be-
cause of the complementarity between w and φ, and as φi is strictly increasing in wi ,
prices exist such that I ǫ is an equilibrium group structure.
Let ǫ′ ≡ ǫ
w−w
. Total surplus is bounded below by:
∫w
w−ǫ′
w(K1+w)dw +
∫w−ǫ′
w
w(K1+w)dw (10)
Case 2: α= ǫ′, K1−K0 >w −w
In this case, agent’s exhibit status-concern. With α = ǫ′, there exist no prices that im-
plement the group structure I ǫ in an incentive compatible way as for anywi ∈ I
ǫ at the
boundary between gi and gi+1:
u(wi ,φi+1,0)−u(wi ,φi ,1)=wi (wi +ǫ
′
−wi )+ǫ
′wi (0−1)= 0
which cannot be incentive compatible (see Corollary 2.1). Active groups (except for
the highest-quality one), must have measure greater than ǫ. Maximum social surplus
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is then bounded above by
∫w
w−ǫ′
w(K1+w)dw +
∫w−ǫ′
w
w(K0+w)dw +
1
8
ǫ′(w −w) (11)
Comparing Cases 1 and 2, the difference in welfare is at least:
1
8
ǫ′−
∫w−ǫ′
w
w(K1−K0)+
∫w−ǫ′
w
w(w −w) (12)
As (K1−K0)→∞, the welfare loss from the ǫ
′ change in status-concern becomes arbi-
trarily large. Without status concern, the complementarity between quality and type
allows for enough flexibility in providing groups that congestion can be avoided. With
status concern, this might no longer be possible causing a welfare loss - even if the
value of status is small relative to the value of being in group without congestion.
4.2 Status and Social Exclusion
Another question pertains to the ‘degree’ of participation. Is it ever optimal for a social
planner to exclude some agents from joining any group? I refer to this more extreme
version of segregation as social exclusion.
If agents don’t join a group, they are reduced to their stand-alone payoff. This de-
scribes a situation where agents don’t benefit from any social spillovers; their pay-
off does not depend on their peers. Since a social planner has to respect incentive
compatibility and the utility from group membership net of payments by assumption
exceeds the stand-alone payoff, this can only be done through prices. For instance,
tuition feesmight be high enough to deter some people from acquiring any higher ed-
ucation. They then don’t obtain any of the absolute or relative benefits generated by
higher education institutions. Because of the restriction to prices, a planner can only
exclude agents at the bottom end of the type space - the excluded agents are in an in-
terval [w ,w1). If some students are deterred from enrolling at university by the tuition
fees, then all students with lower ability are also deterred by these prices.
In this section it is shown that while a social planner would not choose to exclude
agents if they had preferences over quality42 or status alone, if both concerns matter,
some social exclusion might be a second-best outcome. Social exclusion by a social
planner is thus an issue that arises from the interaction of both types of peer effects.
42At least under some assumption on φ, that make it non-decreasing in agents’ types - see Assumption
9.
29
First, a notion of monotonicity of the quality φ is introduced that captures the idea
that higher types lead to at least weakly higher quality groups - and in this sense φ in-
deed captures the ‘quality’ of the group. Under weak monotonicity of φ, if we observe
two social groups such that all types in the support of one group are higher than those
in the support of the other, we can conclude that the group with higher types also has
(weakly) higher quality.43 This is, for instance, the case if the quality φ is the average
type, the lowest or highest type, or a strictly increasing function thereof. The results
are robust to variations of this definition that capture similar ideas of monotonicity.
Definition 9 (Weakly monotone φ). The group quality φ is weakly monotone if for any
two social groups with support over [w l ,w l ] and [wh ,wh] with w l ≤ wh , the group
qualities are such that φl ≤φh .
If φ is weakly monotone, then without status concern, excluding agents is always
Pareto-dominated:
Lemma 3. Without status concern (U q ) under weakly monotone quality, for any in-
centive compatible group provision mq (w) inducing a partition I = {w1, ...,w} where
w1 > w, there exists an incentive compatible provision m
q ′(w) such that the equilib-
rium under mq ′(w) Pareto-dominates that under m(w).
Without status concern, there is no benefit in pricing agents out of themarket. The so-
cial planner can always increase aggregate welfare by offering these agents a separate
group or merging them into the existing one. Under monotonicity of φ, every parti-
tion of W into convex sets can be sustained as an equilibrium.44 So if one partition
Pareto-dominates another, there exists a price vector such that the corresponding so-
cial groups can be sustained as an equilibrium in the agents’ game. Note that not only
has the planner an incentive to offer prices such that all agents participate, this also
increases the payoffs of all agents directly as prices are lower under full participation.
When agents have preferences over status only (U r ), the situation is almost opposite:
in equilibrium there can at most be one group. Nevertheless, social exclusion is also
43Given aL , φ induces an order of measurable subsets in the agent space (Ω,B). If weakmonotonicity
holds, then this ordering is aligned with the ordering of those sets induced by inf and sup inW if inf
and sup induce the same order for these sets.
44To see this, note that for any two adjacent groups g and h with support over [w g ,w
∗] and [w∗,wh],
weakmonotonicity guarantees that φh ≥φg . Because of supermodularity inw and φ, the willingness
to pay for quality is strictly increasing in w . Since prices are determined by the utility difference
of the cut-off type, we know that without status concern, the increase in utility from the difference
φh −φg is higher for w
∗ than for all w <w∗. There exist prices pg and ph such that all w ≥w
∗ prefer
membership in h while all w <w∗ prefer membership in g .
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not optimal because of the inefficient allocation of rank aswell as thewelfare loss from
reducing some agents to their stand-alone payoff.
Result 6.3. Social exclusion is not optimal when agents have preferences over status
only.
Proof. This follows directly fromCorollary 6.2 where it is shown that under status-only
preferences, full-participation is the unique welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
Even when agents have preferences over both quality and status, the first-best out-
come where the planner does not have to respect agents’ incentive constraints, would
also not produce any exclusion. However, since for the constrained problem the plan-
ner is restricted to agents truthfully reporting their type and thus self-selecting into
groups, exclusion can be a second-best outcome.
Proposition 7. For any incentive compatible group provisionm(w)with partitionI =
{w1, ...,w} where w1 > w, the full-participation group partition I
′ =I ∪{w} achieves
strictly higher aggregate welfare. Under status concern, no provision m′(w)might exist
that sustains I ′ as an equilibrium.
We can develop the argument further and show that given some W and some pref-
erences that include status concern, we can always find a probability measure over
W and a quality function φ, such that at least some social exclusion is a second-best
outcome.
Proposition 8. For every U andW , there exists a weakly monotone quality function φ
andmeasure L such that the exclusion of some agents is a second-best outcome.
Looking at this from a different angle, let’s consider a population where everybody is
a member of a social group in the welfare maximizing, stable equilibrium. What if
this population is joined by new agents? To keep it simple, suppose we extend the
support at the low end of types. Would a social planner offer prices that make these
new agents participate? Without status concern and under weak monotonicity of φ,
the answer is yes. A social planner can always increase aggregate welfare relative to the
initial equilibrium by offering prices such that the new agents form a separate group.
The new welfare maximizing equilibrium also has full participation. This is not the
case with status concern. The social planner might not want the agents to join any
of the existing groups and, as the following result demonstrates, there always exists
a measure over this extended set such that they cannot be offered a separate group.
Even though there might be a larger measure of agents in the population, aggregate
surplus beyond the stand-alone payoff does not necessarily increase.
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Corollary 8.1. For every equilibrium group partitionI ofW , there exists ameasureL ′
over W ′ ≡ [w ′,w]∪W such that I ′ =I ∪{w ′0, ...} is not an equilibrium group structure
for any w ′
i
∈ [w ′,w] and any prices.
If the support is extended at the top end, a similar situation can arise. Social exclusion
occurs because of the effect some agents have on quality. This becomes a stronger
force when there are agents that value quality sufficiently highly. So if there is full par-
ticipation in the welfaremaximizing equilibrium for someW and if thisW is extended
by some interval (w ,w ′], depending on the preferences andφ, thismight lead to a pos-
itive degree of social exclusion. While here at least for monotone φ aggregate surplus
necessarily increases - noting that full participation could bemaintained - agents with
low type can be left reduced to their outside option.
5 Privatization
What if the incentives of the group provider are less aligned with the agents’ prefer-
ences? For instance, an authority might be maximizing revenue instead of welfare.
Tuition fees might be set very differently if the objective is to maximize receipts rather
than benefits from education. Alternatively, we can think of an authority handing over
this task to one or several private companies. What are the consequences of such a
privatization? Moving away fromaggregatewelfare as an objective, the next section fo-
cuses on firms supplying groups to maximize profits. As before, a provider posts a set
of prices and then agents decide which group to join. As will be shown, if preferences
are separable in rank and quality, status concern unambiguously lowers the increase45
in revenue from splitting any given group - segregation is less beneficial. But we reach
some negative result for the comparison with the social planner: no clear conclusion
can be drawn whether a monopoly leads to more or less segregation or social exclu-
sion. As an example shows, a monopolist might exclude too few agents relative to the
constrained welfare maximum. I provide some sufficient conditions when this is the
case.
Competition, in comparison, leads to lower prices and less social exclusion in some
cases but a general statement is not possible without making stronger assumptions
on the interactions among firms and consumers. Nevertheless, similar to the previous
results, the presence of status concern tends to exacerbate social exclusion.
45Or magnifies the decrease
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5.1 Monopoly
A natural starting point for this line of inquiry is to examine themonopolist’s problem.
Just like in the social planner’s case, the monopolist offers an incentive compatible,
individually rational group provision m(w) =
(
y(w),p(w)
)
.46 Since the provision of
groups is assumed to be free, a monopolist offers a group provision that maximizes
revenue.
We can state the monopolist’s problem as:
max
y(w),p
∑
G
pgL g (W )
s.t . U (w,m(w),L A)≥U (w,m(w
′),L A) ∀w,w
′
∈W
U (w,m(w),L A)≥ u ∀w ∈W
(13)
where y(w) is a function that assigns an agent of type w an action g ∈ A, and L A is
the vector of social groups generated by this assignment.
We first look at the problem for preferences that are separable in φ and r in the form:
U (w,m(w),L A)≡ u
(
w,φy(w)
)
+ v
(
w,ry(w)(w)
)
−p(w)
Differences in group quality do not affect the importance of rank. As discussed before,
this fulfils Assumption 4. With this restriction, we can establish that under status con-
cern, segregating any group increases revenue by less than it would underU q .
Suppose there exist a group provisionsm(w),mq (w) for preferences with and without
status concern such that the partition I represents the associated equilibrium group
structure. Suppose further that I ′ is a strictly finer partition than I , and there are in-
centive compatible provisionsm′(w),mq ′(w) that induce I ′. Furthermore, prices for
each group structure are such that profits are maximized given the group structure.
Proposition 9. If utility is separable in φ and r , then offering m′(w) achieves higher
profits than m(w) under status concern only if offering mq ′(w) achieves higher profits
than offering mq (w)without status concern.
If group quality does not interact with status directly,47 the incentive to segregate is
46As before, incentive compatibility requires that p(w) is constant over the support of each active social
group and we can thus focus on prices for each group rather than each agent.
47I.e.
∂2
∂φ∂r
u(w,φ,r )= 0
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weaker for preferenceswith status-concern; just as in the social planner case. As status
concern ‘increases’ in importance, this effect gets stronger. To demonstrate this, we
can parametrize status concern as before:
Uα(w,m(w),L A)≡ u
(
w,φy(w),ry(w)(w)
)
+αv
(
w,ry(w)(w)
)
−p(w)
And again, letmα(w) andmα
′(w) refer to the incentive compatible, revenuemaximiz-
ing group provision that, under status concernwith parameterα, lead to the partitions
I and I ′, where I ′ is finer than I :
Corollary 9.1. The group provision mα
′(w) achieves higher profits than mα(w) under
Uα only if mαˆ
′(w) achieves higher profits than mαˆ(w) underUαˆ for all αˆ ∈ [0,α].
Note that for this result, we only assumed separability of the component that magni-
fies status concern. Even when no clear-cut ordering between preferences with and
without status concern is possible, we can still order the effects within this class of
preferences. Naturally, this includes the case where utility is separable in φ and r .
Stronger status concernweakens the incentive to segregate for a private provider. Sup-
pose, for example, a private company is tasked with developing a housing project. If
people have strong preferences over their relative standing in their housing commu-
nity, then the revenue from offering segregated communities is lower than if they only
cared about the quality of their community. The stronger the concern for rank relative
to quality, the more beneficial it is to offer an inclusive community.
Without separability, the result in Proposition 9 holds for sufficiently weak interaction
between φ and r . In the general case, the outcome is more ambiguous and depends
on the magnitude of the interaction as well as the relative changes in group quality.
Intuitively, this is because splitting a group might lead to lower quality for one and
higher quality for the other group. Status concern generally lowers price differences
and thus the benefit from splitting a group. But since r and φ are complements, the
reduction in price at the low end of the group might be less under status concern. In
other words, the lower quality impacts the agent with rank 0 in the lower quality group
less because of his low rank. And since the utility of this agent determines the price of
the low-quality group, the drop in revenue caused by the reduction in quality is less.
In some cases, this could compensate for the negative revenue effect rank has for the
high-quality group. Nevertheless, we can still identify some cases where a clear com-
parison is possible.
The table below summarizes the different cases that can occur when ‘splitting’ a group
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with support over some interval into a high- and a low-type group. In particular,
suppose a monopolist offers a modified provision such that a group with support
over [w g ,w g ] and quality φg is instead separated into two groups with support over
[w l ,w l ] and [wh ,wh] where w l = w g , wh = w g , and w l = wh with qualities φl and
φh . The effect of this group provision on overall revenue depends on the difference
between the new qualities φl , φh and the initial group quality φg . As is summarized
below, whether or not we can in this case establish an ordering of the effect on revenue
between preferences with andwithout status concern depends on the sign of the qual-
ity differences. Of course, for any such new structure to be an equilibrium, the new
provision needs to be incentive compatible which necessarily requires φl <φh .
φl φh increase in revenue: status vs. no-status
(1) <φg <φg ambiguous
(2) <φg >φg ambiguous
(3) >φg >φg lower under status concern
(4) >φg <φg not incentive compatible
Table 1: Comparison of revenue effects - proof see appendix
A clear-cut comparison is only possible if the split leads to an increase in quality for
both groups - case (3). Offering the corresponding group provision increases revenue
under status concern only if it increases revenuewithout status concern. Interestingly,
even though this split has the most positive welfare effect in terms of quality, status
concern unambiguously reduces the return from offering this provision. A monopo-
listic provider could cause a large welfare loss. But it also highlights that a monopolist
might induce less segregation than a social planner.
In cases (1) and (2), a comparison is less straight-forward due to the nature of the com-
plementarities. Observe that a drop in utility for a type w g and an increase in utility
for a type w g both (weakly) reduce revenue.
48 Compared to preferences without sta-
tus concern, the revenue effect of a drop in quality is less negative at r = 0. Or in other
words, the price difference pg −p
′
l
that makes this provision incentive compatible at
w l is smaller. A low ranked agent is less sensitive to a drop in quality. At the same
time, an increase in quality at r = 1 has a more negative negative effect on revenue.
High ranked agents are more sensitive to changes in quality. In all cases, the price dif-
ference p ′
h
−pg is less under status concern. This leads to the ambiguity in the overall
effect which depends on the relative magnitudes of all these factors.
48The former has a strict negative effect while the latter only takes effect for wh <w
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Social Exclusion - Monopolist
Concerning social exclusion, the effect of status concern - comparing preferencesU
andU q - is twofold. On the one hand, excluding an entire group that could be offered
in equilibrium is more beneficial under status concern. However, the increase in rev-
enue from lowering the price at the lowest cut-off - and thus offering a group to more
agents - is generally greater when agents’ have status concern. Overall, this means the
presence of status concern can lead to more or less social exclusion.
The first effect - the greater benefit of excluding an entire group - is captured by the
following result: Suppose for preferences with and without status concern there exist
incentive compatible group provisionsm(w),mq (w) andm′(w),mq ′(w) inducing the
partitionsI = {w1, ...,w} andI
′ ≡w∪I respectively - i.e. there is less social exclusion
underI ′. Suppose further the provisionsmaximize profits given the group structures.
Result 9.2. Offering m′(w) instead of m(w) leads to higher revenue under status con-
cern, only if offering mq ′(w) instead of mq (w) leads to higher revenue without status
concern (U q ).
To see this, notice that the intra-group utility difference
U (w g ,m(w g ),L A)−U (w g ,m(w g ),L A)
is larger under status concern due to the difference in rank. This means by excluding
the lowest group, all prices can be raised by that intra-group difference. The logic is
the same as in the classic monopoly screening problem of Mussa and Rosen (1978);
serving low types has a negative effect on the revenue from higher value types. When
agents have status concern, this effect is stronger. The monopolist can raise prices by
more if a group is excluded - i.e. if p(w) and q(w) are the price schedules with and
without status concern then for all non-excluded w , we have q(w)− q ′(w) < p(w)−
p ′(w).
However, there are cases when a separate group couldn’t even be offered in an incen-
tive compatible way. Exclusion is then a question about the effect of marginal changes
in the lowest cut-off on revenue. Looking at any given group structure: raising the
lowest price to exclude more agents has a less positive effect on revenue when agents
care about status since the low rank of a cut-off agent reduces the effect from poten-
tial changes in quality (and the effect of the increase in w itself). This is due to the
complementarity in rank, type and quality. If a monopoly provider raises the tuition
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fees of all universities, some students choose not to attend. Given the same change in
price, more students are excluded under status-concern since the students’ valuation
at the cut-off is ‘depressed’ by the low rank. Status concern can thus, in principle, lead
to more or less exclusion if a monopolist serves the market.
The direct comparison between a monopolist and a social planner on the basis of so-
cial exclusion in equally ambiguous. But this means a monopolist might set a lower
price for the lowest quality group and thus exclude fewer agents than a social plan-
ner. This is beneficial to agents with low type. As discussed earlier, the social planner
might exclude a set of agents if they have a sufficiently negative influence on the qual-
ity of the adjacent group but they cannot be offered a separate, incentive compatible
group. The monopolist’s incentives, in contrast, are independent of whether or not
the agents could be offered a separate group and only depend on the influence on the
utility of the cut-off type - as this determines prices. Thismeans themonopolist might
exclude fewer agents than the social planner. A numerical example for exactly this
case is presented later. The following result summarizes this argument. Note that here
separability of status and quality is no longer required.
Suppose I = {w1, ...,w} is an equilibrium group structure with w1 >w for somem(w)
andI ′ = {w ′1, ...w} is an equilibrium group structurewithw
′
1 <w1 for somem
′(w) and
w ′
i
= wi for all i > 1 - the group structure only differs in the cut-off type of the lowest
group; under I ′ fewer agents are excluded.
Result 9.3. If u(w ,φh ,0)−u(w ,φl ,0) is sufficiently close to 0 for all φh ≥ φl , and if for
any [w g ,w g ]⊂W , the quality φg is weakly increasing in w g , then aggregate welfare is
higher under m′(w) than m(w) only if profits are higher under m′(w) than m(w).
If excluding agents has a very small effect on the utility of the cut-off type, then doing
so has little benefit to the monopolist. An increase in price will lead to a decrease in
revenue. To the social planner, however, excluding agents might still be beneficial as
long as it raises the utility of (some) other members of the group. In that case, a mo-
nopolist prefers excluding fewer people than a social planner. Intuitively, if the student
with the lowest relative ability in a university benefits very little from interaction with
the other students - maybe because he socializes less - then amonopoly provider can-
not benefit from making the university more exclusive. In comparison, an authority
maximizing welfare might still prefer to do so if it sufficiently benefits students that
have a higher relative standing.
As the previous discussion highlights, comparing the optimal provisions of a social
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planner and amonopolist does not generally allow for straight-forward results if agents
care about their status. Regarding the degree of segregation, amonopolistmight achieve
higher profits with a strictly finer group structure even if this lowers quality in all of the
more segregated groups. On the other hand, a monopolist might prefer a coarser pro-
vision even though there exists a provision that achieves a finer group structure with
higher quality in all of the more segregated groups. Similarly, a monopolist might in-
duce less or no social exclusion while a social plannermight choose to exclude agents.
The ambiguous interaction between type, quality and rank denies any more clear-cut
comparison without stronger assumptions on preferences.
5.2 Competition
Instead of a monopolist, the market for social groups might be served by several com-
peting firms - municipalities competing for inhabitants or universities competing for
students with the goal to maximize revenue. This section provides a brief discussion
of some of the implications of such a competitive environment. It is shown that at
least for full-participation outcomes, competition leads to lower prices and poten-
tially even subsidized memberships. Furthermore - unlike in a monopoly setting - no
set of agents is excluded if they could be offered a separate group. Competition thus
reduces social exclusion in some cases. Nevertheless, status concern allows for equi-
libria with social exclusion even though without status concern, offering the excluded
agents a separate groupwould be a Pareto-improvement. Competition does, however,
not generally lead to more or less segregation or social exclusion. Ultimately, stronger
assumptions on the agents’ coordination would be necessary to derive sharper pre-
dictions.
Suppose instead of a single firm, there is a large (countable) number of potential providers.
As in the monopoly case, every firm can offer a menu of prices and assignments. We
combine all these offers into the set of group provisions:
{mn(w)}n∈N
where mn(w) is the offered group provision of firm n. Since each firm offers their
own, ‘unique’ groups, agents joining group yi (w) according to some provisionmi (w)
are members of a different group than agents joining group y j (w) according to some
m j (w) with i 6= j . The timing is unchanged: the firms simultaneously offer group pro-
visions and maximize revenue given the other firms’ and the agents’ strategies. Then
the agents simultaneously choose a supplier and report their type. This is still referred
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to as the agents’ game. Different agents can, of course, go to different suppliers so
that, for example, some setW1 ⊂W is supplied by firm i while a different setW2 ⊂W
is supplied by firm j . Agents of the same type, however, are restricted to choose the
same supplier. This ensures that all equilibria in this game are stable.
To keep this closely aligned to the monopoly setting, this is modelled as a mecha-
nism µ that, given the firms’ offers and the agents’ report of their type, recommends a
provisionmn . This µ is called the market provision:
Definition 10. The market provision µ is a BW -measurable function that assigns ev-
ery type w ∈W a group and price consistent with some group provision mn(w)(w) ∈
{mn(w)} j∈N :
49
µ(w)=mn(w)(w)
Given the continuum of players, the coordination aspect needs to be carefully consid-
ered as single-player deviations on the agents’ side have no bearing on the aggregate
outcome. For example, if all agents decided to join a particular group, there cannot be
a beneficial deviation to another group for any single agent. Without any restriction,
any incentive compatible group structure can be an equilibrium outcome because of
the coordination aspect in the agents’ game. In the previous setting, we circumvented
the problem by selecting the seller-optimal equilibria through a mechanism. With a
large number of competing firms, a focus on seller-optimal outcomes seems inap-
propriate. It appears natural to shift some of the advantage towards the agents. We
therefore focus on equilibria that are Pareto-efficient from the agents’ perspective:
Definition 11. Amarket provision µ given a set of provisions {mn(w)}n∈N is Pareto effi-
cient in the agents’ game if there is no other market provision µ′ given {mn(w)}n∈N such
that all agents are weakly better-off and a positivemeasure of agents is strictly better-off.
The analysis focuses on all market provisions that are incentive compatible, individu-
ally rational, and Pareto-efficient in the agents’ game and that are a Nash equilibrium
from the firms’ perspective. Formally, these are the subset of subgame-perfect equilib-
ria in which themarket provision constitutes a Pareto-efficient correlated equilibrium
in the agents’ game.50 As again incentive compatibility requires that active prices51
49This reduces to the monopoly case for N = 1 and µ being the identity function µ(w)=m(w).
50It is not necessary that each firm’s provision is incentive compatible as only a subset might choose
this firm in equilibrium. Thus only the market provision needs to be incentive compatible. There is,
however, no loss in focusing only on the prices and groups chosen by a measurable set of agents.
51Recall that ‘active’ prices refers to those prices that are associated with a group that is chosen by a
measurable set of agents.
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are constant over the support of a social group, the equilibrium outcomes can be de-
scribed in terms of the vector of active social groupsL A, the partitionI generated by
the social groups, as well as the price vector p - with the maintained convention that
pi ≥ p j if i > j . In this context, we can distinguish between settings where prices are
restricted to be non-negative p(w) ∈R+ and settings where subsidies for some groups
are feasible p(w) ∈R.52
The focus on Pareto-efficiency in the agents’ game allows us to derive a Bertrand-type
result. In any equilibrium where no agents are excluded, the lowest (active) price has
to be 0. If not, some other firm could offer a price vector that undercuts the other
firm while maintaining the same group structure. This would necessarily be a Pareto
improvement in the agents’ game; the market provision would have to recommend
this firm’s provision to all agents and this would allow that firm to capture the entire
market.
Result 9.4. In a competitive setting with p(w) ∈R+, any full-participation equilibrium
that is Pareto-efficient in the agents’ game has the lowest active price p1 = 0.
If the restriction to non-negative prices is removed, it becomes possible to subsidize
membership in lower quality groups. This ensures that profits are reduced to 0. Nat-
urally, this is only possible in a full-participation outcome; with p1 ≤ 0, no agents can
be excluded. Furthermore, it implies that all full-participation equilibria are payoff-
equivalent to one where a single supplier serves the entire market.53 The intuition is
as follows: At least the highest quality group has to be offered at a positive price to
ensure non-negative profits. If one supplier offers all groups that are priced positively,
then this supplier can also provide the highest membership subsidies. The equilib-
rium that is Pareto efficient from the agents’ perspective is the one with the lowest
prices - this is the case for a single supplier. In general, the number of firms providing
active groups in a stable equilibrium with full-participation cannot be larger than the
number of active (weakly) positive and (weakly) negative prices. If, for example, there
two active groups, there can be only one supplier. However, this does not imply that
there will generally be full participation. In fact, allowing for non-negative prices has
no influence on equilibria with a positive level of social exclusion.
Result 9.5. In a competitive setting with p(w) ∈ R, any full-participation equilibrium
Pareto efficient in the agents’ game with more than one active social group has p1 < 0.
52In the case of a monopolist supplier or social planner, a restriction to non-negative prices is inconse-
quential as all incentive compatible group structures can be implemented with non-negative prices
and subsidies are never profit maximizing for a monopolist.
53To maintain equilibrium, at least one other firm has to offer the same provision but it is not recom-
mendedmy the market provision to a measurable set of agents.
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The number of firms providing active groups is bounded by both the number of non-
positive active prices and the number of non-negative active prices. All firms make 0
profits.
Competition also rules out some cases of social exclusion. In particular, if a set of
agents at the low end of W can be offered a separate group, then excluding them can-
not be an equilibrium. A firm could offer a group provision that leads to a Pareto im-
provement for all agents. This differs from the monopoly setting where a monopolist
might have an incentive to not offer this group in order to increase revenue. Never-
theless, as discussed before, if status concern is sufficiently strong, it might not be
possible to offer such a separate group that maintains incentive compatibility for all
other social groups.
Result 9.6. Suppose there is an incentive compatiblemarket provisionµ inducing group
structure I = {w1, ...,w} and µ
′ inducing group structure I ′ = {w0,w1, ...,w}. Under
competition, I = {w1, ...,w} is not an equilibrium group structure.
Competition is, in some sense, good news to the agents in at least the full participa-
tion equilibria. It necessarily drives down all group prices relative to the correspond-
ing monopoly prices. On top of that, it also rules out some equilibria where agents
are excluded: under competition, no set of agents is excluded if they could at least be
offered a separate group without changing the remaining group structure. Neverthe-
less, despite the focus on Pareto efficient equilibria, competition does not necessarily
lead to an increase in aggregate welfare or even just a reduction in social exclusion. In
particular, in settings where many equilibria are on the agents’ Pareto frontier, there
can be equilibria with higher prices and lower welfare compared to themonopoly out-
come. The example in the following section details such a case.
The role of status here is more subtle. Without status concern, the number of active
social groups could approach infinity. This can pose a problem for existence. As was
shown in Proposition 4, the number of active social groups under status concern in
any equilibrium is bounded. In this sense, competition does not immediately lead
to a problem with existence. Furthermore, the presence of status concern implies
that changes in social groups have more heterogeneous effects on agents. Shifting
the group boundary or splitting a group into several groups can increase the utility of
some agents and reduce that of others due to the accompanying changes in rank. As a
consequence, many different equilibria can lie on the agents’ Pareto frontier.
In comparison to amonopoly setting, no social exclusion occurs in cases where agents
can be offered a separate group. But if status concern is sufficiently strong, this might
not be incentive compatible. Without status concern, such a group would always be
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offered in a competitive market. Status concern exacerbates social exclusion even in a
competitive setting. In fact, there can be competitive equilibria with more agents ex-
cluded than both in the planner and the monopoly environment. The overall effect of
competition on welfare is thus ambiguous. It is dependent on how exactly the agents
(can) coordinate and further research would be desirable to examine the competitive
provision in more detail.
6 Numerical Example
The following example illustrates previous claims about the social exclusion induced
by a social planner and amonopolist: itmight be a second best to exclude some agents
from participating and, in fact, more agents than in amonopoly setting. Furthermore,
it is demonstrated that even in a competitive environment, agents might be excluded
- and indeed potentially more so than under the two other market structures.
In the example below, types are distributed over [1,2] according to a (truncated) Pareto
distribution with parameter 1. The example is set-up such that there can be at most
one group in equilibrium. Depending on the relative importance of quality and rank,
we can create scenarios inwhich both a social planner and amonopolist exclude some
agents, only the planner excludes agents or neither excludes any agents. In one case,
the monopolist offers a price that all agents accept while the social planner offers a
price such that all agents with type lower than w1 ≈ 1.22 prefer their outside option.
In each of the cases, the quality of the group is determined by the lowest type in the
group. Accordingly, if we compare this to a setting where agents have preferences over
status only (e.g. r = 1/2 for all w), segregating a given partition further always leads to
an increase in welfare and there always exists a price vector that makes this incentive
compatible.
Example 1: Types are distributed according to a truncated Pareto distribution (shape
a = 1) over [1,2]. Preferences are represented by:
U (w,g ,L A)= (α1+β1w
γ1)φg + (α2+β2w
γ2) ln(rg (w)+
1
2
)−pg (14)
The quality of a social group L g > 0 is given by:
φg =
1
2
+
1
2
w g (15)
Example 1 [Table 2] gives an indication of the underlying logic for the exclusion of
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Table 2: Optimal levels of social exclusion
(1) γ1 = 15.48 γ2 = 15.50 eq. group structure
social planner wSP1 ≈ 1.22 I
SP = {1.22,2}
monopolist wM1 = 1 I
M = {1,2}
(2) γ1 = 15.00 γ2 = 15.00
social planner wSP1 = 1 I
SP = {1,2}
monopolist wM1 = 1 I
M = {1,2}
(3) γ1 = 16.00 γ2 = 15.00
social planner wSP1 ≈ 1.44 I
SP = {1.44,2}
monopolist wM1 ≈ 1.88 I
M = {1.88,2}
For all cases:α1 = 560, α2 = 15ln(2)
−1, β1 = 1 β2 = ln(2)
−1
agents. Social exclusion occurs in cases (1) and (3); in (1) only the social planner ex-
cludes agents and in (3), both the planner and the monopolist exclude agents. In case
(1), the complementarity between type and quality is stronger than in case (2) where
no exclusion is optimal. In principle, this provides an incentive to exclude some agents
in order to raise the quality, given that the quality is determined by the lowest type. At
the same time, the complementarity between rank and type is also stronger than in (2).
Excluding agents lowers the rank of almost everyone in the group. This is an offsetting
force to the increase in quality. While on aggregate the quality dominates - hence the
positive social exclusion in the planner case - the monopolist does not take into ac-
count the higher utility of agents strictly inside the support. In this case, an increase in
price does not sufficiently increase revenue generated by the agents joining the group
to compensate for the loss of revenue from the excluded agents. A monopolist prefers
to serve all agents as in (2). In case (3), the complementarity is strong enough that the
incentive to raise quality by excluding agents dominates for both the planner and the
monopolist.
Extending the example to a competitive environment, we first note that since in any
equilibrium there can be atmost one group, competition does not necessarily lead to 0
profits. However, there does exist a full-participation equilibrium where p1 = 0 with a
single group - which follows from Result 9.4. But as indicated, there are other equilib-
ria on the Pareto frontier where there is social exclusion. In fact, there is a continuum
of equilibria with w1 ∈ [1,1.76]. At high levels of exclusion, welfare is even lower than
in the monopoly case.
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Table 3: Social exclusion in a competitive environment
(1*) γ1 = 15.48 γ2 = 15.50 eq. group structure
competition any wC1 ∈ [1,1.76] is
PE in the agents’ subgame IC = {wC1 ,2}
As before: α1 = 560, α2 = 15ln(2)
−1, β1 = 1 β2 = ln(2)
−1
7 Conclusion
In thismodel, a large number of agents observe a set ofmembership prices and simul-
taneously decide which group to join. Group membership gives them access to social
spillovers generated by the othermembers. In particular, agents have preferences over
the composition of the group (the quality) and their rank in the distribution of types
within the group (their status). The novel aspect of this paper is the exploration of the
role of status concern in such a setting. The focus lies on the consequences for segre-
gation and social exclusion.
The paper establishes and qualifies two broad claims: Firstly, status concern limits
the degree of segregation. It is a force for homogeneity across groups. Furthermore,
it reduces the benefit in terms of welfare and revenue from segregating agents. The
incentive to segregate any given group is, in many cases, lower under status concern.
This applies - albeit to different degrees -whether themarket is served by a social plan-
ner, a monopolist or by competitive firms. Secondly, status concern in combination
with preferences over the quality of a group can aggravate social exclusion. It can be
a second-best outcome to exclude a positive measure of agents. Status concern also
creates a stronger incentive for a monopolist to exclude a set of agents even though
they could be offered a separate group. And even in a competitive setting, there can
be equilibria with a positive degree of social exclusion. Most importantly, by com-
paring this to the setting in Board (2009), where agents do not have preferences over
their rank, we can establish that it is indeed status concern that is driving these results.
Since status concern can lead to different conclusions about the welfare and revenue
maximizing group structures, determining whether agents have preferences over sta-
tus in a given setting can be crucial for empirical investigations. If we observe that part
of the population is excluded from a certain type of social group (e.g. tuition fees be-
ing set such as to exclude some potential students), we cannot immediately conclude
that authority is maximizing profits as opposed to welfare. It could be a constrained
welfare optimum to do so. If the quality of groups ismonotone in types - i.e. the higher
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the types the higher the group quality - and there are complementarities between type
and quality, then without status concern prices are sufficient to separate agents into
any partition of groups. Sorting can be arbitrarily fine. With status concern, this is
not feasible. There is a role for screening methods other than prices. Universities, for
example, rarely rely on prices alone for admission decisions.
If status concern is important, empirical models might need to take this into account.
For instance, Kendall (2003) tries to derive conclusion about whether or not spillovers
in ability in professional basketball exhibit complementarities - stronger players ben-
efitting more from stronger teammembers - by analyzing the concentration of strong
players in teams. It is found that teams are more similar in quality than would be ex-
pected if complementarities were strong. If, however, players care about their rank
within the team, there might be little concentration despite the presence of comple-
mentarities. Status concernmight constrain firms in how they can allocate employees
across teams. In Mas andMoretti (2009) it is found that due to the nature of spillovers
in ability of cashiers, it is efficient to create representative teams for each shift. Never-
theless, the firm does not actively assign workers to shifts. If these workers care about
their relative ability within their team, then workers have a tendency to sort efficiently
without an explicit allocation. More generally, if prices are forced to be equal across
groups (e.g. laws setting tuition fees, union rules equalizing pay, etc.) then we can
expect these groups to be similar in their distribution of agents’ types - if agents care
about status.
As a final comment, it is the absence of status concern that allows for a high degree of
segregation. An authority might want to actively discourage positional concerns and
status thinking. But in this setting, status concern limits the degree to which agents
can be separated. Discouraging positional concern might lead to more rather than
less segregation - and thus to more unequal access to the semi-public good that is of-
fered through the group. On the other hand, positional concerns can lead to the social
exclusion of agents. A policy maker might have to consider this trade-off.
45
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
First, the following Lemma is proved:
Lemma 4. If there are n equal active prices, in any equilibrium the corresponding n
active groups must be identical in φ and their probability distribution overW .
Proof. Take any probability distribution overG×W . Suppose there are n active groups
with equal prices.
Let Gn ⊆ G be the set of these groups. Let furthermore G
n
⊆ Gn such that for any
g ∈G
n
, the corresponding social group L g is such that φg =max{φ j : j ∈G
n}.
Let [wn ,wn] =W n ⊆W be the smallest interval containing the supports of all social
groups in Gn . We first observe that an agent with characteristic w sufficiently close
to wn must be member of an active social group with g ∈G
n
. Suppose not and she’s
member of a group k with φk < φg . Given equal prices, this can only be optimal if
rk(w)> rg (w).
But it follows from continuity of u that there exists an ǫ> 0 such that for any w > w˜ ≡
w −ǫwe have rk(w)− rg (w)< δwhere δ is such that:
u(w˜ ,φg ,rk(w˜)−δ)= u(w˜ ,φk ,rk(w˜))
For any w > w˜ , there is a strict incentive to join a group in G
n
. It follows that agents
sufficiently close to wn must be in a group with the highest quality.
Similarly, agents sufficiently close to wn must be in a group g ∈G
n
. We can conclude
this by noting that for any other group k with k ∉G
n
and rk(w)> rg (w) for all g ∈G
n
there exists some ǫ > 0 such that for all w < w˜ = wn + ǫ we have rg (w)− rk(w) < δ
where δ is such that:
u(w˜ ,φg ,rk(w˜)−δ)= u(w˜ ,φk ,rk(w˜))
For an agent with a sufficiently low type, if prices are equal, there is a strict incentive
to join the highest quality group since the agent’s rank is close to 0 in any group and
∂
∂φ
u(w,φ,r ) is strictly positive for any r .
Furthermore, by the same argument, any agent in a social group k ∈ {Gn \G
n
} with
type w such that rk(w) is sufficiently close to 0 has a strict incentive to join a group in
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G
n
since ∂
∂φ
u(w,φ,r )> 0. Since every group with positive mass must have suchmem-
bers, all such groups need to be inG
n
.
To conclude, we can observe that when prices and quality are equal across a set of
groups, then for anyw ∈W , we need rg (w)= rh(w) for any g ,h ∈G
n
. All active groups
need to be identical in terms of quality and rank for any type. But since the rank of an
agent with type w is equal to the CDF evaluated at w , the CDF over types needs to be
equal across groups.
Using this Lemma, we can prove the Proposition:
Proof. Sufficiency:
If two active social groups L g ,L h have the same probability distribution, then nec-
essarily w g =wh . For indifference, we need:
u(wh ,φh ,0)−ph = u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg
WLOG suppose ph > pg . Then for indifference φh > φg . But since the probability
distributions are equal, we also know that wh = w g > w g . Complementarity in w , r
and φ imply that
u(wh ,φh ,1)−ph > u(w g ,φg ,1)−pg
which contradicts w g =wh .
Necessity:
If for two active social groups pg = ph , then applying the argument from Lemma 4 to
W n = [wh ,wh]∪[w g ,w g ] andG
n = {g ,h}, we can conclude thatφh =φg which implies
that for all w ∈ g ,h we need rg (w)= rh(w) which means the probability distributions
overW must be identical.
Proof of Corollary 1.1:
Proof. a) Suppose not and for some subset B ⊂W we have L g (B) 6= κL h(B). Then it
follows from the Radon-Nikodym theorem that the probability distribution over types
within each group is such that for some w ∈ g , Fg (w) 6= Fh(w). But it follows from
Proposition 1 that this cannot be the case in equilibrium since ph = pg .
b) As the probability distributions have to be the same across both groups, suppose
indeed thatL g = κL h for some κ> 0 but κ 6= 1. Ifφ has returns to scale, thenφg 6=φh
if κ 6= 1. WLOG, asumme that φh >φg . Since rg (w)= rh(w) for all w ∈W and ph = ph ,
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all agents in g have a strict incentive to join h since they obtain the same r but higher
φ at the same price. In equilibrium, φh =φg and therefore L g =L h .
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Take any two active social groups L g ,L h with with g ,h ∈G . By definition, the
smallest convex set containing their support are [wh ,wh] and [w g ,w g ].
Case 1 - bottom:
Suppose monotonicity in quality at the bottom fails such that φh > φg but wh < w g .
Then any agentwith typew sufficiently close towh in group g can instead join grouph
and obtain a strictly higher rank and benefit from higher quality. This switch is strictly
beneficial unless ph−pg is sufficiently large. But due to the complementarity inφ and
w , we know that if w g >wh then
u(w g ,φh ,0)−u(w g ,φg ,0)> u(wh ,φh ,0)−u(wh ,φg ,0)
Therefore, if ph −pg ≥ u(w g ,φh ,rh(w g ))−u(w g ,φg ,0) then
u(wh ,φh ,0)−ph < u(wh ,φg ,0)−pg
Membership in g for agents close to and including wh cannot be optimal.
Case 1 - top:
Suppose strict monotonicity in quality at the top fails such that φh >φg but w g ≥wh .
Using the previous result, we know that
u(wh ,φh ,0)−ph ≥ u(wh ,φg ,rg (wh))−pg
with rg (wh)≥ 0. It follows that
u(wh ,φh ,0)−ph ≥ u(wh ,φg ,0)−pg
From complementarity in φ and w , it must be the case that for all w >wh :
u(w,φh ,0)−ph > u(w,φg ,0)−pg
From complementarity between w and r , and (weak) complementarity between φ
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and r , it follows that:
u(w,φh ,1)−ph > u(w,φg ,1)−pg
and therefore for any rg (w)≤ 1
u(w,φh ,1)−ph > u(w,φg ,rg (w))−pg
All agents with type w such that w g ≥ w > wh must strictly prefer membership in
group h. A contradiction to w g ≥wh .
Case 2 - bottom:
Suppose strictmonotonicity in type at the bottom fails such thatwh >w g butφg ≥φh .
It must be that
u(wh ,φh ,0)−ph ≥ u(wh ,φg ,r (wh))−pg (16)
Since φg ≥φh , this can only hold if ph < pg . But we know that:
u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg ≥ u(w g ,φh ,0)−ph
From complementarity we conclude that this must also hold for agents with w > w g
and furthermore:
u(w g ,φg ,r )−pg > u(w g ,φh ,0)−ph
for all r ∈ (0,1]. Since rg (wh)> 0, groupmembership in h cannot be optimal for agents
close to and including wh . A contradiction.
Case 2 - top:
Suppose strict monotonicity in type at the top fails such that wh >w g but φg ≥φh .
Frommonotonicity in quality at the bottom, we know that w g ≥wh . It follows
u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg ≥ u(w g ,φh ,rh(w g ))−ph
This implies for any r ∈ (0,1] and w ≥w g :
u(w,φg ,r )−pg > u(w,φh ,r )−ph
It follows that
u(wh ,φg ,1)−pg > u(wh ,φh ,1)−ph
A contradiction.
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Proof of Corollary 2.1:
Proof. For any two active social groups with φh > φg , monotonicity in quality at the
bottom implies that wh ≥w g . In equilibrium:
u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg ≥ u(w g ,φh ,0)−ph
But since for any w ∈ W , φ, and r ∈ [0,1] we have ∂
∂φ
u(w,φ,r ) > 0, we need that
ph > pg .
For the other direction, suppose ph > pg . Take the type wh ∈ h with rh(wh)= 0. Nec-
essarily, the rank obtained in the other group is rg (wh) ≥ 0. Suppose now φg ≥ φh .
Monotonicity in quality at the bottom implies w g ≥wh . In equilibrium we need:
u(wh ,φh ,0)−ph ≥ u(wh ,φg ,0)−pg
But if φg > φh , it cannot be that ph > pg as again
∂
∂φu(wh ,φh ,0) ≥ 0. And if φg = φh ,
it follows immediately that we cannot have ph > pg as the above inequality would be
violated.
Proof of Corollary 2.2:
Proof. Case (i) - necessity:
It follows from strict monotonicity in quality at the top that φg = φh . Given strict
monotonicity in type at the bottom, we can then conclude that w g = wh . This im-
plies that ph = pg . It follows from Proposition 1 that the probability distributions need
to be the same.
Case (i) - sufficiency:
If the CDF’s are identical, then since φ has no returns to scale, φ must be identical.
Strict monotonicity in type at the top then implies that wh =w g .
Case (ii) - necessity:
The argument is the same as in Case (i) with the addition that equal quality requires
the measures to be identical for every measurable subset of W.
Case (ii) - sufficiency:
If the social groups are identical, then φ is identical and then strict monotonicity in
type at the top implies wh =w g .
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Suppose there are two active social groups L g and L h that overlap over a set
[w1,w2]⊂W . LetL
ǫ
g be an ǫ-perturbation such thatL
ǫ
g does not differ fromL g over
50
[w ′1,w2] with w
′
1 > w1. Because of the continuity of φ almost everywhere, for every
ǫ there exists such a perturbation (noting that rank is necessarily continuous). If for
every ǫ there exists such aL ǫg with quality φ
′
g such that ǫ> |φ
ǫ
g −φg | > 0, then nomat-
ter the ǫ, all agents in [w ′1,w2] either strictly prefer membership in social group L
ǫ
g or
L h . The equilibrium is not stable.
If this does not exist, then we can conclude from continuity that at least for some such
ǫ-perturbations, φǫg −φg = 0. But then there exist ǫ-perturbations that increase (or
decrease) the status of all agents in L ǫg with type [w
′
1,w2]. Again, all agents in that
interval either strictly prefer L ǫg or L h for all such perturbations. The equilibrium is
not stable.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. We first prove the interval result:
Suppose the support of social groups does not represent an interval partition of a sub-
set of W . Then there must be at least two social groups L g ,L h and a compact set
S ⊂W such that for every subset Si ⊆ S, L g (Si )> 0 and L h(Si )> 0. This requires that
(alomst) all agents in S are indifferent between the two groups.
If not and there is a type w strictly inside S that is not indifferent and, for instance,
u(w,φh ,rh(w))−ph > u(w,φg ,rg (w))−pg
then for a small enough ǫ> 0,
u(w +ǫ,φh ,rh(w +ǫ))−ph > u(w +ǫ,φg ,rg (w +ǫ))−pg
This means types immediately above w must also strictly prefer h. This implies that
rg (w)= rg (w
′) for all w ′ >w . Single-crossing then implies that all w ′ strictly prefer h
to g . The support cannot intersect over S.
But if all types in S are strictly indifferent, then they have measure L (S) > 0 which is
ruled out by Lemma 1.
Finally, we observe that no set of agents [w1,w2] strictly inside of W can be priced
out of every group unless all agents with type w <w1 are also not participating in any
group. If there is any type w ≤w1 in group g , thenU (w,g ,L A)> u. But from single-
crossing we can infer that this is also true for all w ′ >w1.
We can now derive the convexity result:
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Suppose the support of an active social group is not convex. Then there is an interval
W1 = [wl ,wh]⊂W such thatL g ([wl ,wh])= 0 for some group g and there are intervals
Wl = [w g ,w
′
l
] andWh = [w
′
h
,w g ] with L g positive for any measurable subset of these
two intervals and w ′
l
≤wl <wh ≤w
′
h
.
Note that by the previous argument theremust be at least one group f ∈G withL f (W1)>
0.
The membership prices p f and pg must be such that for some wˆ <wh :
u(wˆ ,φ f ,r f (wˆ))−p f ≥ u(wˆ ,φg ,rg (wˆ))−pg
If φ f ≥ φg , then for all w ∈ (wˆ ,wh], the following must be true noting that rg (w) is
constant for all w ∈W1 while r f (w) is increasing:
u(w,φ f ,r f (w))−p f > u(w,φg ,rg (wˆ))−pg
It follows from the single-crossing condition that it cannot be the case that for any
w∗ ≥wh :
u(w∗,φ f ,r f (w
∗))−p f ≤ u(w
∗,φg ,rg (wˆ))−pg
Suppose instead that φ f <φg :
We know that
u(w g ,φg ,0)−pg ≥ u(w g ,φ f ,r f (w g ))−p f
and since u is strictly increasing in r and w , and as r f must be constant in Wl ac-
cording to the interval partition statement, we can conclude that for anyw ′ >w g with
w ′ ∈Wl :
u(w ′,φg ,rg (w
′))−pg > u(w
′,φ f ,r f (w
′))−p f
But then it follows from the single-crossing condition that it cannot be that for any
w ′′ >w g ) that
u(w ′′,φg ,rg (w
′′))−pg < u(w
′′,φ f ,r f (w))−p f
The result follows.
Proof of Corollary 3.1:
Proof. Take any two social groups L g ,L h . Suppose φh > φg . Weak monotonicity in
quality at the bottom implieswh ≥w g . However, it follows from the interval result that
wh 6=w g and thus wh >w g . Everything else follows directly from Proposition 2.
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Proof of Corollary 3.2:
Proof. By definition, there can be no two groups with supports that overlap on a set
of positive measure. It follows from Corollary 3.1 that groups are strictly monotonic
in type which implies that if the supports do not overlap then the quality must be
different.
As a direct consequence of Corollary 2.1, if two groups are not equal in quality then
they can’t be identical in prices. No two active social groups can be equal in price or
quality in a stable equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Denoteφ as the upper-bound to group quality for all feasible social groups and
φ as the lower-bound. As φ is bounded for a given set of agents, these exist.
As in a stable equilibrium active social groups have non-overlapping, convex interval
support, a necessary condition for incentive compatibility is that for any two adjacent
social groups L l ,L h with φh >φl , we have:
u(wh ,φh ,0)> u(wh ,φl ,1)
Notice that due to the single-crossing assumption, if this inequality holds for some
wh , it holds for all w >wh .
For every φ in [φ,φ) and w ∈W , we can define ∆φ(w) as the minimum quality differ-
ence required such that for any δ<∆φ(w), the inequality fails for w meaning
u(w,φ+δ,0)< u(w,φ,1)
while
u(w,φ+∆φ(w),0)= u(w,φ,1)
If no such threshold exists, which would imply
lim
δ→∞
u(w,φ+δ,0)< u(w,φ,1)
then set ∆φ(w)=φ−φ.
For a given w , we can define ∆φ(w) as inf{∆φ(w) :φ ∈ [φ,φ]}. Since for every φ ∈ [φ,φ],
∆φ(w) is greater than 0, this lower bound is greater than 0. Note that if ∆φ(w) was not
bounded away from 0, it would imply that for someφ∗, ∂
∂r
u(w,φ∗,r )= 0 contradicting
∂
∂r u > 0.
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We can then define
∆φ ≡ inf{∆φ(w) :w ∈W }
as the lower bound over all these. Since for every w the difference is bounded away
from 0, this is again strictly positive.
We can conclude that in equilibrium, the number of active social groups is bounded
above by N ≡
φ−φ
∆φ
. For any number of active groups N >N it must be that for at least
one pair of adjacent social groups with φh > φl , we have that φh −φl < ∆φ which im-
plies by definition that φh −φl < ∆φ(wh) which means that incentive compatibility
fails.
Proof of Corollary 4.1:
Proof. Since the number of possible active social groups in an equilibrium is a subset
of N, the least-upper-bound property implies that since it has an upper bound it has
a least upper bound. Take some α as given and suppose kα ∈ N is the corresponding
least-upper-bound.
Let I kα be an equilibrium partition that has exactly kα groups. Let I
′ be a strictly
finer partition. By definition, there exists no price vector p ′ such that I ′ is an equilib-
rium partition. Let p ′ be the price vector such that all cut-off types w ∈ int (I ′) - the
interior of the set - are indifferent between their group and the adjacent groups. If this
does not exist, then for some wh ∈I
′ and adjacent groups h, l ∈G :
u(wh ,φh ,0)+αv(wh ,0)< u(wh ,φl ,1)+αv(wh ,1)
But if this is true for some α, it is true for all α′ >α.
If instead such a p ′ does exist, then for some w ∈ g and some group h with φh >φg :
u(w,φl ,rl (w))+αv(w,rl (w))−p
′
l < u(w,φh ,0)+αv(w,0)−p
′
h
We take h as the group immediately adjacent to l meaning that wh =w l but the argu-
ment goes through for any group g withφg >φl . Asα increasesα(v(w,rl (w))−v(w,0))
increases. But it follows from incentive compatibility of p ′ at the cut-off that:
p ′h −p
′
l =α(v(w l ,0)− v(w l ,1))+u(w l ,φh ,0)−u(w l ,φl ,1)
As v(w l ,1)− v(w l ,0) > v(w,rl (w))− v(w,0), any increase in α reduces the price dif-
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ference by more than it increases the loss in utility from the lower rank. If incentive
compatibility fails at some w for α, it fails for all α′ >α.
Finally, note that if p ′ is incentive-compatible at the cut-off types, we do not need
to consider agents switching from a higher to a lower-quality group because of the
single-crossing assumption. Consequently, kα is weakly decreasing in α.
Proof of Corollary 4.2:
Proof. Suppose there are two active social groups L g ,L h .
If prices are equal, then agents have a strict incentive to join the group in which they
achieve the higher rank. In equilibrium, it must be that rg (w) = rh(w) for all w ∈W
which implies that the CDF’s are identical.
Now suppose prices are not equal and assume wlog that ph > pg . We can deduce
that agents close to w must be in g since the rank difference between groups is ar-
bitrarily close to 0 for agents sufficiently close to w . Furthermore, there exists an
ǫ > 0 such that agents with types in [wh ,wh + ǫ) must also be in g . This follows since
rg (wh) ≥ rh(wh) = 0. For a small enough ǫ, all agents in [wh ,wh + ǫ) have a strict
incentive to be in g since the rank difference rg (w)− rh(w) is either positive or suf-
ficiently small. But this is a contradiction since there exists a δ > 0 such that agents
in [wh ,wh +δ) must be in h by definition of wh . It must be that ph = pg . In a sta-
ble equilibrium, this cannot be the case which follows from Corollary 3.2. The result
follows.
Proof of Lemma 2 :
Proof. Suppose not and a measurable set of agents pay different prices for the same
groupmembership. This implies that there are setsW1,W2 ⊂W with y(w
′)= y(w ′′) for
allw ′,w ′′ ∈W1∪W2, and p(w1)= p(w
′) for allw1,w
′ ∈W1 as well as p(w2)= p(w
′′) for
all w1,w
′ ∈W1. However, p(w1) 6= p(w2) for all w1 ∈W1 and w2 ∈W2. Suppose w.l.o.g.
that p(w1)< p(w2). This group provision cannot be incentive compatible as agents in
W2 could obtain strictly higher utility by reporting a type inW1 as
u(w2,φy(w1),ry(w1)(w2))−p(w1)> u(w2,φy(w2),ry(w2)(w2))−p(w2)
since y(w1) = y(w2) and misreporting the type does not affect the rank of an agent
conditional on being assigned to the same group. The result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 2 that p(w) needs to be constant over the sup-
port of each social group.
As m(w) assigns each type w ∈ W a choice in A, the support of each social group
generated by m intersect on a measure 0 set by construction. It follows that if the
assignment y(w) is an equilibrium given p, it is a stable equilibrium. Following the
equilibrium definition (Definition 2), incentive compatibility and individual rational-
ity directly imply an equilibrium in the agents’ game. Every incentive compatible and
individually rationalm(w) is a stable equilibrium in the agents’ game.
To show the other direction, note that in an equilibrium in the agents’ game, prices
are constant for each group by construction since p contains a price for each g ∈ A
(but nomore). The equilibriumdefinition implies directly incentive compatibility and
individual rationality. The result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. I prove the contrapositive: if splitting a group is not beneficial without status
concern, it cannot be beneficial under status concern since the benefit from doing is
is necessarily less.
Since I ′ is a finer group structure than I , there exists at least one active social group
L g under I whose support is split into several groups under I
′. Suppose the sup-
port of g is split intoL l andL h with qualitiesφl andφh . WLOG, assume thatφl <φh
noting that they can’t be equal ifm′ is incentive compatible. If a refinement does not
increase welfare without status concern, then there are w l =wh ∈I
′ such that:
∫w l
w l
u
(
w,φl ,r0
)
dF (w)+
∫wh
wh
u
(
w,φh ,r0
)
dF (w)
≤
∫wh
w l
u
(
w,φg ,r0
)
dF (w)
(17)
where r0 is the fixed reference rank ofU
q .
Comparing this to preferences with status concern, we note first that it follows from
the quality-status-neutrality assumption that for i ∈ {l ,h} and for any φ:
∂
∂φ
∫w i
w i
u
(
w,φ,ri (w)
)
dF (w)=
∂
∂φ
∫w i
w i
u
(
w,φ,r0
)
dF (w)
We can conclude that, fixing the ranks agents obtain after the split:
∫w l
w l
u
(
w,φl ,rl (w)
)
dF (w)+
∫wh
wh
u
(
w,φh ,rh(w)
)
dF (w)
≤
∫w l
w l
u
(
w,φg ,rl (w)
)
dF (w)+
∫wh
wh
u
(
w,φg ,rh(w)
)
dF (w)
(18)
The final step is to show that the rank re-allocation creates an additional welfare loss
which would imply that the right-hand-side of inequality (18) is strictly less than the
utility in the coarser group g which is:
∫w l
w l
u
(
w,φg ,rg (w)
)
dF (w)+
∫wh
wh
u
(
w,φg ,rg (w)
)
dF (w) (19)
I show this using an intermediate step with an auxiliary construction that allows to
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demonstrate that any re-allocation of rank in themanner of the split induces a welfare
loss. This is then used to show that splitting any group is less beneficial under status
concern - the result follows.
Take a hypothetical group structure with two types of agents, w− and w+ where w− ≤
w+. The measure of agents is as in [w l ,wh]. Denote this k0 ≡LW ([w l ,wh]). First, we
can look at the limit case where w− = w+ = w but all ranks are still allocated. Mak-
ing use of the probability integral transform, we can establish that the distribution of
ranks in any group is uniform. The hypothetical aggregate welfare from such a group
with quality φ can then be written as:
k0
∫1
0
u(w,φ,x)dx
Since k0 only acts as a scaling parameter, it can be normalized to 1. The integral can
be written in two alternative but equivalent ways where again w− =w+ =w .
Firstly, for some x ∈ (0,1):
∫1
0
u(w,φ,r )dr =
∫x
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr +
∫1
x
u(w+,φ,r )dr
and secondly:
∫1
0
u(w,φ,r )dr = x
∫1
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr + (1−x)
∫1
0
u(w+,φ,r )dr
Nowconsider aw+ >w− =w . From the complementarity inw and r , we can conclude
that
∫x
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr +
∫1
x
u(w+,φ,r )dr > x
∫1
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr + (1−x)
∫1
0
u(w+,φ,r )dr
as ∫1
x
uw (w
+,φ,r )dr > (1−x)
∫1
0
uw (w
+,φ,r )dr
If there is a difference in types between one group and the other, aggregate utility is
higher when ranks a higher in the high-type group.
Next note that for w+ → w , u(w+,φg ,x) is the lower bound for almost all w with
r (w) ≥ x in the original group. We can re-write the sums in terms of integrals over
types instead of ranks.
Firstly,
k0
∫1
x
u(w+,φ,r )dr =
∫wh
w+
u(w+,φ,r (w))dF (w)
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where r (w)≡
F (w)−F (w l )
F (wh)−F (w l )
.
and secondly:
k0(1−x)
∫1
0
u(w+,φ,r )dr =
∫wh
w+
u(w+,φ,r ∗h (w))dF (w)
where r ∗
h
(w)≡
F (w)−F (wh)
F (wh)−F (wh)
.
Inspecting r ∗
h
(w) and r (w), we can conclude that for almost all w ∈ [w+,wh], r
∗
h
(w)<
r (w). For w+→ wh , we can write the difference between the hypothetical utility and
the actual sum of utilities as:
∆w+ ≡
∫wh
w+
(
u(w,φ,rh(w))−u(w
+,φ,r (w))
)
dF (w)
and
∆
∗
w+ ≡
∫wh
w+
(
u(w,φ,r ∗h (w))−u(w
+,φ,r ∗h (w))
)
dF (w)
Observe that for almost every w
u(w,φ,r (w))−u(w+,φ,r (w))> u(w,φ,r ∗h (w))−u(w
+,φ,r ∗h (w))
due to the complementarity in r and w and therefore:
∆w+ >∆
∗
w+
An equivalent argument can be constructed for w−. Re-writing both summations we
get:
k0
∫x
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr =
∫w−
w l
u(w−,φ,r (w))dF (w)
and
k0x
∫1
0
u(w−,φ,r )dr =
∫w−
w l
u(w−,φ,r ∗l (w))dF (w)
with r ∗
l
(w)≡
F (w)−F (w l )
F (w l )−F (w l )
.
We can again conclude by inspection that for almost allw ∈ [w l ,w
−], r ∗
h
(w)> r (w). As
before, for w−→ wh we re-write the difference between this hypothetical utility and
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the actual utility as:
∆w− ≡
∫w−
w l
(
u(w−,φ,r (w))−u(w,φ,r (w))
)
dF (w)
and
∆
∗
w− ≡
∫w−
w l
(
u(w−,φ,r ∗l (w))−u(w,φ,r
∗
l (w))
)
dF (w)
Again, due to the complementarity in w and r , we can conclude that ∆∗w− > ∆w− . It
follows that
∫wh
w l
u(w,φ,r (w))dF (w)= k0
∫1
0
u(w,φ,r )dr +∆w+ −∆w−
> k0
∫1
0
u(w,φ,r )dr +∆∗w+ −∆
∗
w−
=
∫w l
w l
u(w,φ,r ∗l (w))dF (w)+
∫wh
wh
u(w,φ,r ∗h (w))dF (w)
where wh =w l .
The alternative assignment of ranks strictly lowers utility. As the effect of a change
in φ is the same with and without status concern and the ranks necessarily change in
the above defined fashion caused by any split in the support of a group, any finer pro-
vision has a less positive effect on welfare under status concern than without status
concern. As any finer provision can be regarded as an iteration of binary splits, the
result follows.
Proof of Corollary 6.1:
Proof. The result follows from the proof of Proposition 6 if we re-define the ∆w and
∆
∗
w differences accordingly. ∆w+ and ∆
∗
w+
are then:
∆w+ ≡
∫wh
w+
(
u(w,φ,rh(w))−u(w
+,φ,r (w))+α(v(w,rh(w)− v(w
+,rh(w))
)
dF (w)
∆
∗
w+ ≡
∫wh
w+
(
u(w,φ,r ∗h (w))−u(w
+,φ,r ∗h (w))+α(v(w,r
∗
h (w)− v(w
+,r ∗h (w))
)
dF (w)
And we observe that∆w+−∆
∗
w+
is, for the same reason as before, positive and increas-
ing in α. The equivalent statement is true for −(∆w− −∆
∗
w−). The result follows.
Proof of Corollary 6.2:
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Proof. It follows from the proof of Proposition 6 that changing the rank allocation for
every type w to a lower rank reduces aggregate welfare.
In particular,
∫w
w− u(w,rw−(w))dF (w) decreases for a FOSD shift in r (w) which corre-
sponds to an increase in w− noting that
rw−(w)≡
F (w)−F (w−)
F (w)−F (w−)
An upward shift in the lower boundary of any group reduces welfare for that group.
Furthermore, it follows equally that splitting the support of any group, say the full
participation group, strictly decreases welfare. The welfare maximizing equilibrium
is the full participation equilibrium. Supposem(w)= (g ,0) for some g ∈G . All agents
joining group g satisfies the participation constraint as p(w) = 0 and since there is
no other active group, incentive compatibility holds. This is an equilibrium group
provision.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Proof. Suppose the social planner offers an incentive compatible group provision in-
ducing prices p and partition I = {w1, ...,w} with w1 >w .
This implies that the lowest price in p, call this p1, is greater than 0; otherwise agents
with type w ∈ [w ,w1) have a strict incentive to join that group.
Because of the complementarity in type and quality, there exists amq ′(w) with prices
p ′ that maintains partition I ′ = {w0,w1, ...,w} as an equilibrium as long as φ0 < φ1,
where φi is the quality of the group with support over [wi ,wi+1]. This is guaranteed
by weak monotonicity.
Since the quality of all social groups under mq remain unchanged, aggregate utility
from agents with types in [w1,w] does not change. However, agents in (w0,w1] re-
ceive payoffs strictly above their outside option which raises aggregate utility. This
also implies prices of all active groups are now lower than before as p ′1 ≤ u(w1,φ1)−
u(w1,φ0)+u(w0,φ0)−u < u(w1,φ1)−u = p1. where u is the agents’ stand-alone pay-
off. It must be that p ′(w)< p(w) for all w ∈ [w1,w]. All agents that were member of a
group undermq pay a lower price undermq ′(w) for the same groupmembership and
all agents in (w0,w1] are strictly better-off. This is a Pareto-improvement.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof. It follows almost immediately from Lemma 3 that extending the interval parti-
tion at the tail end by adding another element strictly increases aggregate welfare. As
u(w,φ,r )≥ u for any w ∈ [w ,w], φ ∈ [φ,φ] and r ∈ [0,1], the same applies here. If a p ′
exists such that I ′ is incentive compatible for all w , then this is an equilibrium with
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higher aggregate welfare and strictly higher utility for almost all agents.
However, such a p ′ might not exist as is shown in the example in Section 6.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Proof. We construct a φ and L to validate the claim.
Take some typew∗ ∈W withw∗ >w and let S be anymeasurable set inB andW S the
smallest convex set inW that contains all types w in S.
φ(S)=


infW S + supW S forsupW S ≤w∗
infW S +w∗ forsupW S >w∗
This quality function is weakly monotone.
We can now establish that for for any group structure I = {w1,w2, ...} with w1 ≤w
∗ <
w2, there exists no set of prices such thatI
′ = {w0}∪I for anyw0 ∈W withw0 <w1 is
a stable equilibrium group structure if w∗ is sufficiently close to w . This implies that
there is no incentive compatible group provisionm′(w) that achieves the partitionI ′.
This follows from the fact that the quality difference between any two adjacent groups
whose quality is weakly less than that of [w1,w2] is bounded by the quality differ-
ence between the group with support [w0,w1] and the group with support [w1,w2].
This difference is w∗−w . As w∗ → w , this difference goes to 0 while the difference
u(w,φ,1)−u(w,φ,0) is bounded away from 0 for any w and φ. This means if there is
any active group withw∗ in the support, there can be no other active group with types
lower than w∗ in any equilibrium - if w∗ is sufficiently close to w .
Let now w1 =w
∗ and the difference w∗−w = δ> 0 such that no separate lower qual-
ity group can be offered. We can setL ([w∗,w) sufficiently close to 1 for every w >w∗
such that excluding w∗ is never optimal. We can conclude that any group structure
that is an equilibrium in the agent’s game can be either written as I (i.e. no full par-
ticipation with the lowest-quality group containing w∗ in it’s support) or as the full-
participation structure w ∪ {I \{w1}}. It remains to be shown that offering a group
structure of type I is optimal for some L .
To this end, we first note that φ does not depend on L beyond what is already deter-
mined byW . Suppose nowL ([w ,w∗])= ǫ. OfferingI instead ofI ′ = {w}∪{I \{w∗}}
lowers the rank of almost every agent with type [w∗,w2] but increases the quality of
that group byw∗−w0 = δ> 0. While the quality change is independent ofL , the rank
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decrease for every agent is atmost ǫ. Finally, we note thatw2−w
∗ cannot be arbitrarily
small because if w2→w
∗ then the quality difference between group g2 and g1 goes to
0 which cannot be incentive compatible.
Suppose w2 <w meaning that there is a group g2. In this case, let
w2 ≡ inf{w ∈W : u(w,φ2(w),0)−u(w,φ1,1)> 0}
where φ2(w) is the quality of the group with support over [w2,w3] with w2,w3 ∈ I .
This is the lower bound such that u(w2,φ2,0)−u(w2,φ1,1) ≥ 0 for all w2 ≥ w2. Note
that this must be strictly greater thanw∗ as u is strictly increasing in rank andφ2→φ1
for w2→w
∗. If there is no g2 meaning that I only describes one group, set w2 =w .
Due to the continuity of U , we can conclude that there exists a small enough ǫ > 0
such that for every equilibrium group structure I with w∗ = minI , the increase
in aggregate utility for agents in [w∗,w2] outweighs the loss from excluding [w ,w
∗)
and the loss in rank of agents in [w∗,w2] given that both the loss in aggregate utility
as well as the loss in rank are decreasing in ǫ while the increase in quality remains
the same and L ([w∗,w2]) ≥ L ([w
∗,w2]) > 0 for any equilibrium partition I . We
conclude that for every equilibrium I , offering the full-participation group structure
I
′ = {w}∪{I \{w∗}} strictly lowers aggregate welfare under the proposed quality func-
tion. The result follows.
Proof of Corollary 8.1:
Proof. LetI be a group partition ofW for an equilibriumm(w) with a corresponding
price vector p. Supposew ∈I , meaning there is full participation. This is without loss
since otherwise we can adjust the definition ofW accordingly. Let’s extendW at the
bottom-end by an interval [w ′,w) and call [w ′,w)∪W ≡W ′. Let L ′ be the measure
overW ′ with the obvious restriction that L ′(A)=L (A) for all A ⊆W .
Consider a partition I ′ = {w ′}∪I . As shown before, this strictly increases welfare
and can thus be implemented by the social planner if there exists a p ′ such that the
corresponding group assignments are incentive compatible.
Let L 0 be the social group with support over [w
′,w] and L 1 the social group with
support over [w ,w1]. Furthermore, let φ0 and φ1 be the group qualities. Let φ
′ be the
lower bound of φ given W ′ and L ′. It is for the following argument without loss to
assume φ0 =φ
′.
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Fix a givenL ′. Now construct an alternativemeasureL ǫ withL ′(W ′)=L ǫ(W ′) such
that almost all agents in [w ′,w] are ‘close’ to w . In particular, let L ǫ be such that
L
ǫ([w−ǫ,w])=L ǫ([w ′,w]−ǫ. This is defined for ǫ<min
{
w −w ′,L ′([w ′,w])
}
. Note
that as ǫ→ 0, the measure approaches the (scaled) dirac measure.The measure might
influence φ′ but since the interval is fixed, we know the quality is bounded by some φ
for all measures.
If φ1 ≤ φ0, no set of prices exists that would sustain I
′ as an equilibrium. Suppose
instead φ0 <φ1. Given that almost all agents are within [w −ǫ,w], the rank difference
r0(w − ǫ)− 0 is by construction ǫ meaning that r0(w)− r0(w − ǫ) = 1− ǫ. For ǫ small
enough, u(w ,φ1,0)−u(w − ǫ,φ1,0) is arbitrarily close to 0. But note that u(w ,φ0,1)−
u(w − ǫ,φ0,0) does not converge to 0 as for every w and r ∈ [0,1), ur (w,φ,r ) > 0. As
ǫ→ 0, agents at w − ǫ have a strict incentive to join g1 instead of g0. The partition is
not incentive compatible. As we used the lower bound φ to show this, the result is
independent of how [w ′,w] and is partitioned.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Proof. I demonstrate that splitting a group into two groups is less beneficial to a mo-
nopolist under status concern. Since every refinement can be written as an iteration
of such splits, this suffices to prove the proposition.
Take any equilibrium group provision m(w) and social group L g with support over
[w g ,w g ]. Recall that p denotes the price vector arising fromm(w).
It follows from the discussion on pricing that the price a monopolist can charge for
agents in g is pg = u(w g ,φg )+ v(w g ,0)−κ where κ is either the stand-alone utility u
or, if there is a group ‘below’, κ is the utility an agent of type w g would obtain if he
reported a type that would have him assigned to the group below i.e. U (w g ,m(w g −
ǫ),L A) for an arbitrarily small ǫ> 0. Since any split of g does not affect the utility and
prices in the groups below, we can treat κ as a constant. Any refinement of g affects
the price at w g only through changes in quality.
Suppose the monopolist offers a finer provision m′(w) such that g is split into two
groups [w l ,w l ] and [wh ,wh] where w l =w g and wh =w g with prices p
′
l
and p ′
h
.
It follows from incentive compatibility that all prices higher than pg in the original
p need to be adjusted to make the new provision incentive compatible. The effect on
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revenue is determined by the change of all prices p ′
i
≥ p ′
l
noting that for every price in
p with pi ≥ pg , there is a corresponding price p
′
i
in p ′ and there is one additional price
p ′
h
that does not map from any previous price. We decompose these into the effect
caused by p ′
l
−pg which affects all prices pi ≥ pg and the effect of introducing a new
price p ′
h
, which increases all prices pi > pg by p
′
h
−p ′
l
.
It follows from the discussion on incentive compatibility thatφl <φh and p
′
l
< p ′
h
oth-
erwise m′(w) could not be an equilibrium provision. Because of the separability, we
can conclude that p ′
l
−pg is the same for preferences with andwithout status concern.
It is equal to u(w g ,φl )−u(w g ,φg ) noting that, for preferences with status concern, the
v component cancels. All prices p(w) in the initial provision greater than pg , if any,
have to adjust by the same difference u(w g ,φl )−u(w g ,φg ) in the new provision.
Furthermore, the ‘split’ adds an ‘additional’ price p ′
h
and all prices in the initial pro-
visionwith p(w)> pg need to further adjust by p
′
h
−p ′
l
for the new provision. It follows
from incentive compatibility that p ′
h
= p ′
l
+u(wh ,φh)−u(wh ,φl )−
(
v(wh ,1)− v(wh ,0)
)
.
The difference to the price these agents paid under p is equal to:
p ′h −pg = p
′
l −pg +u(wh ,φh)−u(wh ,φl )−
(
v(wh ,1)− v(wh ,0)
)
(20)
As shown before, p ′
l
−pg is the same with and without status concern while v(wh ,1)−
v(wh ,0) is strictly positive under status concern and 0without. The change in revenue
from splitting any group is strictly larger without status concern.
Proof of Corollary 9.1:
Proof. The argument follows that in the proof of Proposition 9. We first observe that
p ′
l
−pg does not depend onα as the effect of a change in quality on the utility of a type-
w l agent does not depend on α. However, the change in price paid by every agent in
[wh ,w] as defined in Equation (20) needs to be restated as:
p ′h −pg = p
′
l −pg +u(wh ,φh)−u(wh ,φl )−α
(
v(wh ,1)− v(wh ,0)
)
This is decreasing inα noting that p ′
l
−pg is unaffected byα. The change in revenue is
larger for smaller α as the price difference that makes the split incentive compatible is
decreasing in α.
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Proof of Result 9.2:
Proof. Both I and I ′ are equilibrium group structures. Let again p and p ′ be the
price vectors generated from p(w) and p ′(w). I denote the lowest price in p as p1 and
the lowest in p ′ as p0 since p
′ has one more price than p.
For the proof, I distinguish between the price vectors under status concern (p,p ′) and
the prices inducing the same structure without status concern (q,q ′).
The total gain in revenue from offering the full-participation group structureI ′ under
status concern is:
p ′0− (p1−p
′
1)[1−F (w1)]
and equivalently for preferences without status concern.
We observe that
p ′1 = p1−
[
U (w1,m
′(w),L g )−U (w ,m
′(w),L g )
]
i.e. the intra-grouputility difference for the lowest groupunderm′. (Recall thatU (w1,m
′(w),L g )=
u(w1,φ0,1) since r (w) is determined by the true not the reported type). Furthermore,
p ′0 = u(w ,φ0,0)−u.
The prices without status concern are accordingly:
q ′1 = q1−
[
U q (w1,m
q ′(w),L A)−U
q (w ,mq
′
(w),L A)
]
and q ′0 = u(w ,φ0,r )−u.
As u(w,φ,1)−u(w,φ,0)> 0, it follows from complementarity that the intra-group util-
ity difference is larger under status concern meaning:
[
U q (w1,m
q ′(w),L A)−U
q (w ,mq
′
(w),L A)
]
<
[
U (w1,m
′(w),L g )−U (w ,m
′(w),L g ))
]
and thus
q ′0 = u(w ,φ0,r )−u ≥ u(w ,φ0,0)−u = p
′
0
we can conclude that
p ′0− (p1−p
′
1)[1−F (w1)]< q
′
0− (q1−q
′
1)[1−F (w1)]
The result follows.
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Proof of Result 9.3:
Proof. Suppose amonopolist offersm(w) instead ofm′(w) with prices p(w) and p ′(w)
respectively. Incentive compatibility requires that the price difference at the lowest
cut-off is:
p1−p
′
1 = u(w1,φ1,0)−u(w
′
1,φ
′
1,0)
Since φ is bounded, we can set φh =φ and φl =φ. If u(w ,φh ,0)−u(w ,φl ,0)= ǫ, then
this implies that u(w1,φ1,0)−u(w
′
1,φ
′
1,0) < ǫ. For any I , incentive compatibility re-
quires:
p1−p
′
1 < ǫ
For any higher quality group g , pg−p
′
g < p1−p
′
1 < ǫ. This is due to the fact for incentive
compatibility, all such prices increase by p1 − p
′
1 but, at the same time, need to be
reduced by u(w2,φ1,1)−u(w2,φ
′
1,1)> 0.
The effect on profits is thus bounded above by
ǫ[1−F (w1)]− [F (w1)−F (w
′
1)]p
′
1
As ǫ→ 0, this becomes negative. Excluding agents with types in [w ′1,w1) is not optimal
for the monopolist. As a final step, we show that welfare is not bounded by this.
The welfare increase can be positive as for all r (w)> 0:
u(w,φ,r (w))−u(w,φ′,r (w))> u(w,φ,0)−u(w,φ′,0)
and it is thus feasible that
∫w2
w1
(
u(w,φ1,r1(w))−u(w,φ
′
1,r1(w)
′)
)
dF (w)>
∫w1
w ′1
(
u(w,φ′1,r1(w)
′)−u
)
dF (w)
The increase in w ′1 weakly lowers the rank of all agents in [w1,w2] but if φ1 −φ
′
1 is
sufficiently large, this is beneficial for almost all agents in that group. The aggregate
welfare of all other groups is unchanged. The effect of excluding more agents is thus
either negative or positive while for sufficiently small ǫ, excluding more agents always
lowers profits.
Proof of Result 9.4:
Proof. Suppose there is a full participation equilibriumwith the lowest price p1 > 0. If
the price vector arising from the market provision is p, some firm i can offer a pi (w)
such that the price vector for the corresponding provision is p−ǫ for some ǫ> 0. Since
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all the price differences between groups remain the same, if the equilibrium provision
µ(w) induced the group structure {L g } then this is also an equilibrium under the new
prices. Since ǫ > 0, all agents are strictly better off. µ′ must be such that the group
structure is identical but all agents pay the lower price according to p−ǫ. The firm of-
fering these prices would capture the entiremarket. For small enough ǫ, this increases
revenue for any firm not serving the entire market before.
Proof of Result 9.5:
Proof. Take any equilibrium, full-participation group structurewith social groups {L g }g∈G
and prices p. Suppose there are K ≥ 2 active groups. Suppose further that p is normal-
ized so that the lowest price p1 = 0 - this is always possible for full participation group
structures. The lowest price vector p ′ that maintains the same group structure and
achieves 0 profits is such that:
p ′ = p−
K∑
2
pkL k(W )
If N firms are serving the market, then they must all make 0 profits. If not, then there
exists some firm providing active groupsGn such that
Π
n
=
∑
Gn
p ′kL k(W )> 0
Another firm can offer prices p˜ = p−ǫΠn for some ǫ> 0. This is a Pareto-improvement
to all agents since the group structure does not change but prices are lower. For ǫ small
enough, it strictly increases profits for this firm. This implies at least the lowest active
price p ′1 < 0 in equilibrium.
Suppose the number of active social groups in a ≥ 2. Then thenumber of non-negative
active prices is a− ≥ 1. Note that if there is no such price, at least one firmwouldmake
positive profits since the number of active groups is K ≥ 2 and so there is at least one
strictly positive price. If now N > a−, then there is at least one firm providing only
positively priced groups which, by the previous argument, cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, suppose a+ is the number of non-negative active prices. (Note that either
a+ + a− = a or a+ + a− = a + 1). If N > a+ i.e. the number of firms is greater than
the number of strictly positive active prices, then at least one firm must provide only
negatively priced active groups. This firm makes negative profits and has a strict in-
centive to raise prices. This cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof of Result 9.6:
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Proof. SupposeI = {w1, ...,w} is an incentive compatible group structure under p and
I
′ =w0∪I with w0 <w1 is incentive compatible under p
′. We note that under p ′, all
active prices p ′
i
with i ≥ 1 are less than pi . To exclude agents in the interval [w0,w1), it
must be that p1 =U (w1,µ(w1),L A)+p1−u - an agents withw1 is indifferent between
joining and not joining. Under p ′, we need that agents with w0 are indifferent. Incen-
tive compatibility requires that at the cut-off U (w1,µ(w1),L A) = U (w1,µ(w0),L A)
but as utility is increasing in rank, U (w1,µ(w0),L A) > u. It must be that p
′
1 < p1.
Furthermore, since all groups with higher types are unchanged, pi −p
′
i
= p1−p
′
1 > 0.
Since almost all agents in [w0,w1) are strictly better off and all agents in higher qual-
ity groups pay a lower price, this is a Pareto improvement. Since it allows one firm to
capture the entire market, it follows from previous arguments that there is a strict in-
centive for at least one firm to offer p ′ if all other firms offer p. I is not an equilibrium
group structure.
A.1 Comparison Table
We first observe that in all cases, the price difference between two adjacent groups is
lower under status concern as u(w,φh ,0)−u(w,φl ,1)< u(w,φh ,r )−u(w,φl ,r ).
Case 1: φl <φg and φh <φg
We observe that as φ and r are complements, pg − p
′
l
= u(w l ,φg ,0)−u(w l ,φl ,0) is
less than u(w l ,φg ,r )−u(w l ,φl ,r ) for the reference utility at 1 > r > 0, which is the
price change under status concern. Since this leads to a drop in revenue, the effect is
weaker under status concern. Furthermore, u(wh ,φg ,1)−u(wh ,φh ,1) is larger than
u(wh ,φg ,r )−u(wh ,φh ,r ) which has a greater positive effect on revenue ifwh 6=w (i.e.
there is at least one additional active group with higher quality).
Case 2: φl <φg and φh >φg
The effect for the low quality group is as in Case 1. For the top group, we note that
the increase in quality has a negative effect on revenue at wh if there are groups with
higher types. This is because u(wh ,φh ,1)−u(wh ,φg ,1) is larger than u(wh ,φh ,r )−
u(wh ,φg ,r ). This difference reduces revenue as the price difference to groups above
has to fall by that amount. If the weighted difference for the higher p ′
l
under status
concern outweighs the lower prices p ′
i
> p ′
l
, then the increase in revenue is larger un-
der status concern and vice versa. The overall effect is thus ambiguous.
Case 3: φl >φg and φh >φg
The effect of the change φh −φg is as above and has a more negative impact un-
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der status concern. To reach the conclusion that the increase in revenue is less un-
der status concern, we note that p ′
l
must increase by less under status concern since
u(w l ,φ,0)−u(w l ,φg ,0) is less than u(w l ,φ,r )−u(w l ,φg ,r ) for any φ > φg . We con-
clude that under status concern p ′
l
− pg is lower, p
′
h
− pg is lower and the difference
p ′
i
−pi in all prices pi > pg is less. Under status concern, revenue increases less (de-
creases more) when offering p ′ instead of p.
Case 4: φl >φg and φh <φg
This would imply φl >φh which is ruled out by Corollary 3.1.
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B Convergence
The following result shows that, loosely speaking, the stronger the status concern, the
more similar any active groups have to be in equilibrium. Given a parametrized spec-
ification of preferences, for a given αn let L
n
g and L
n
h
be any two equilibrium social
groups for some price vector p. There always exists such an equilibrium sinceL g and
L h can be identical and equally priced. We can denote the corresponding probability
distributions overW as Fng and F
n
h
. The following result shows that for any sequence
of (αn)n∈N that is strictly increasing and converging to infinity, any corresponding se-
quence (Gn)n∈N where G
n ≡ Fng −F
n
h
- the difference of two equilibrium probability
distributions given αn - must converge to 0 and this convergence is uniform.
Proposition 10. For any increasing sequence (αn)n∈N converging to infinity, the dif-
ference of the probability distributions over W for any corresponding sequence of two
active social groups in equilibrium converge uniformly to 0.
Proof. For any two groups h, l with φh ≥ φl , we can establish an upper bound on the
rank difference such that there can exist prices that make these two groups incentive
compatible. As the price of any group must be increasing in φ (see Corollary 2.1), we
know that ph ≥ pl with strict inequality if the quality difference is strict.
For every w ∈W , let
∆r (w)= supRw
where
Rw =
{
rl − rh : rl ,rh ∈ [0,1]&u(w,φh ,rh)−u(w,φl ,rl )+α [v(w,rh)− v(w,rl )]> 0
}
This is the maximum rank difference that can be sustained in equilibrium for any w .
If ∆r (w)= 0, then it must be that φh =φl or there can be no such two groups in equi-
librium as incentive compatibility requires that∆r (w)> 0 otherwise ph−pl ≤ 0 which
implies that incentive compatibility fails for type w if φh >φl .
As φ is bounded, we can conclude that this maximum rank difference is bounded for
every w by:
∆
∗
r (w)= supRw
where
Rw =
{
rl − rh : rl ,rh ∈ [0,1]&u(w,φ,rh)−u(w,φ,rl )+α [v(w,rh)− v(w,rl )]> 0
}
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We can define the upper bound over all these ∆
∗
r (w) for a given α as
∆
∗
r (α)=max{Rw :w ∈W }
Ifα is sufficiently large, then due to the boundedness of utility we have∆
∗
r (α)< 1. This
implies that Fh(w)−Fl (w)≤∆
∗
r (α) for all w ∈W .
Take any increasing sequence {αn}n∈N where αn→∞ as n→∞.
For every ǫ > 0, there exists an N such that ∆
∗
r (αn) < ǫ for all n > N . This means that
Fh−Fl converges uniformly to 0. Asφ andφ are upper and lower bounds on the quality
of any two groups and as uφ > 0, themaximum difference in rank for any two qualities
φ>φh ≥φl ≥φ is bounded by ∆
∗
r (α). The result follows.
Corollary 10.1. For any increasing sequence (αn)n∈N converging to infinity, the proba-
bility distribution over (w1,w]⊆W for some w1 ≥w for any corresponding sequence of
active social groups in equilibrium converges uniformly to the population distribution
F .
Proof. If in any equilibrium there is an active social group L g that somewhere over
its support differs from L on some subset Wd ⊆ W , then it follows from Assump-
tions 1 and 3 that there must be another active social group L h different from L g
with L h(Wd )> 0. But it follows from Proposition 10 that if there are two active social
groups, then as α→∞, they must be arbitrarily similar. But then either there is only
one active group in some interval, in which case L g =L over its support. Or there is
more than one but as αn →∞, the difference in their probability distributions must
go to 0 and so they both must converge to L which implies that their associate prob-
ability distributions converge to F . It again follows from 10 that this convergence is
uniform.
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